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Di re c to r :  A lb e r t  Borgmann
This thesis  examines Heidegger 's  phi losophy o f  technology w i th  a 
view toward e la b o ra t in g  and c l a r i f y i n g  our concerns about modern 
technolog ica l  s o c ie ty .  His mature works serve as a bold counter ­
p o in t  to the indecis iveness which surrounds technology as a p h i l o ­
sophical  problem. Heidegger 's  concern is tha t  technology,  as the 
d e st in y  o f  our modern age and the way in which being is d is c losed ,  
w i l l  e c l ip s e  both o th e r  modes o f  d isc losure  and man's a b i l i t y  to 
respond to th a t  d is c lo s u re .  Such a s t r i k i n g  but austere  stance  
leaves us w i th  two major problems: 1) what is the ro le  o f  human
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ,  and thus freedom, in t h i s  d e s t i n y  o f ‘be ing ,  and 
2) how can We make good Heidegger 's  c a l l  to attend, things such tha t  
there  is s u f f i c i e n t  counterweight to technology.
The e la b o ra t io n  and i l lu m in a t io n  o f  t h i s  stance is made through 
Being and Time. Here Heidegger analyzes man's r e la t io n s h ip  w i th  
the world in a f u l l  and concrete way, and the work thus provides a 
s u i t a b le  basis f o r  examining an everyday o r i e n t a t i o n  toward th ings .  
Though Being and Time e labora tes  Heidegger's p o s i t io n  against  a 
background o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  ph i losophy, we see th a t  i t  remains am­
biguous in regards to  d e l in e a t in g  a counterpos i t ion  to technology.
The in au then t ic  ex is tence  o f  the " they" i l l u s t r a t e s  in a concrete  
way modern technologica l  l i v i n g .  But since Being and Time seeks to  
a r t i c u l a t e  the antecedent condi t ions o f  man's e x is tence  i t  must 
a r t i c u l a t e  both a u th e n t ic  and in a u th e n t ic  e x is te n c e .  At the t r a n s ­
cendental level  Being and Time cannot d is t in g u is h  between the two.
The re so lu t io n  o f  t h i s  ambiguity comes in He idegger! s commitment to 
the d isc losure  and o r i e n t a t i o n  given by things as seen in h is  mature 
wo r k .
Thus by reading h is  mature works through Being and Time we f i l l  
out Heidegger's c r y p t i c  d e c la ra t io n  concerning technology.  The 
re fe rence  and o r i e n t a t i o n  given in our everyday concerned deal ings  
reveals  what is lo s t  by the order ing  o f  resources.  In such a reading  
we see the meaning o f  a u th e n t ic  resolve towards th in g s ,  the socia l  
s e t t i n g  o f  technology,  and the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  reform in our day-  
to -day  undertakings.
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1. In t roduct ion
Heidegger 's  v is ion  o f  technology must i l lu m in a t e  our i n t u i t i o n s  
and concerns about modern technologica l  s o c ie ty  i f  h is  v is io n  is to  
have any bearing on the cl a r i f i c a t  ion sought in a phi losophy o f  tech­
nology.  That i s ,  i f  our i n t u i t i o n s  and concerns about technology are  
not sharpened in such a way th a t  technology and i t s  in f luence  are made 
perspicuous, then we gain l i t t l e  by studying Heidegger.  These concerns 
are  d e c is iv e :  they serve as the mooring f o r  our in q u i ry  o f  technology,
a l lowing us to s o r t  out the complex and sometimes confusing aspects o f  
modern technologica l  l i v i n g .  Indeed, the lack o f  v is io n  o r  o r i e n t a t i o n  
in technology prompts us to seek c l a r i f i c a t i o n ;  tha t  lack o f  o r i e n ­
t a t io n  can only be recognized against  the background o f  a concern.
The phi losophy o f  technology has only  re c e n t ly  emerged as a
d i s t i n c t  f i e l d .  Yet recogni t ion  o f  and consensus w i th in  t h is  area on
what the problems are seem to be on the d i s t a n t  horizon . As Paul Durbin
po in ts  o u t ,  the subject o f  technology has in the past twenty years gone
from ta n g e n t ia l  mentioning to the p u b l ica t io n  o f  an annual devoted
s p e c i f i c a l l y  to the problems o f  technology.^ This n e a t ly  t raceab le
emergence comes w i th  the growing recogni t ion  th a t  technology plays a
major ro le  in our l i v e s .  What is not c le a r  is what ,  i f  any,  d i s t i n c -
2t i v e l y  ph i losophica l  issues technology poses. I n i t i a l  discussion in 
the f i e l d  centers around what technology i s ,  and on i t s  r e la t i o n  to 
Other  endeavors,  e .g .  , 'sc ience,  p o l i t i c s ,  o r  economics. But much 
emphasis is also placed on concrete p o l i t i c a l  and e t h i c a l  issues,  such
2
as the environmental c r i s i s  o r  medical h e ro ic s ,  where technology plays
3a d i r e c t  and obvious r o le .
S t i l l  the recogn i t ion  o f  technology as a ph i losophic  problem
remains e lu s iv e :  the to p ic  remains outs ide  the discussion o f  standard
ph i losop h ic  problems. I t  is not covered in anthologies  used to  i n i t i a t e
students  to ph i losophic  concern; i t s  discussion takes on the a i r  o f  a
s p e c ia l i z e d  f i e l d  o f  i n t e r e s t  w i thout  connection to l a r g e r  ph i losophic
endeavors.  In Anglo-American phi losophy,  phi losophy o f  technology has
developed out o f  h i s t o r i c a l  and s o c io lo g ica l  approaches; Mumford's
4Technics and C i v i l i z a t i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h i s .  The socia l  concern over
technology has developed an intense i n t e r e s t  in the moral problems o f
biomedical technology.  But t h i s  area o f  i n t e r e s t , as Carl Mitcham
points  o u t ,  is not sharply  defined e i t h e r .
At some p o in t  b io e th ic s  begins to shade in to  
another less w e l l - d e f i n e d  a re a ,  the m u l t i fa ce te d  
environmental  issue .  Ph i losophica l  questions  
c lu s t e r in g  around problems o f  p o l l u t i o n ,  ecology,  
energy ,  the socia l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  s c i e n t i s t s ,  
technology assessment, and a l t e r n a t i v e  technology  
a l l  r e l a t e  to phi losophy o f  technology.  In f a c t ,  
they are l i k e l y  to become primary f o c i . 5
O
C le a r ly  the a t t e n t i o n  phi losophers do pay to technology s ignals  
th a t  "something o f  a problem" is emerging,  but what i t  is is clouded by 
the many and ambivalent  m a ni fes ta t ions  o f  technology and the i l l - d e f i n e d  
ro le  i t  has as a problem.^ The divergence o f  foc i  l i s t e d  above, the 
var ious approaches one may ta k e ,  as w e l l  as the nagging question about 
p r e c is e ly  what one means by ' te c h n o lo g y 1 a t t e s t  to the morass in which 
philosophy o f  technology f inds  i t s e l f .  Indeed, there are those who con­
tend t h a t  there is no problem w i th  technology to begin w i t h ,  save i t s
3
im p er fec t io n ,  cured by u t i l i z i n g  more and b e t t e r  technology.^ There are  
those who f in d  the proper analys is  o f  technology in economics, the socia l  
sciences,  or e n g ineer ing ,  since ana lys is  o f  technology'may be given in 
a l l  o f  these areas and there  would be l i t t l e ,  i f  any,  c o n t r ib u t io n  by 
philosophy.^
But there  is a t h i r d  possible  reason f o r  our i n a b i l i t y  to f in d  
anything a t  issue in technology: technology is the unquestioned and
dubious presupposi t ion o f  our l i v e s ;  to acknowledge a problem here is 
tantamount to recogniz ing a f law  in the f a b r i c  o f  our l i v e s .  Does one 
muse p r o fe s s io n a l ly  about c ruc ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in one's l i f e ?  I t  is  
quest ionable  whether or  not the emergence o f  technology as an academic 
f i e l d  o f  in q u i ry  w i l l  que l l  any d isconcert ion  we might recognize.  Yet  
concrete p o l i t i c a l  and e t h ic a l  issues as wel l  as personal misgivings and 
f ind ings  o f  the socia l  sciences in d i c a t e ,  in a v i v i d  and s t r i d e n t  way,  
the unease we have w i th  technology,  an unease th a t  demands our s o r t in g  
out technology's  manifest  form and r a m i f ic a t io n s .^
Alv in  T o f f l e r ,  in Future Shock, p re d ic ted  th a t  technology would,  
in i t s  rapid turnover  and increased d i v e r s i t y , render us he lp less  in 
coping w i th  change.*® We would be in e f f e c t  numbed by i t s  successes and 
not know what to dp in i t s  presence.  We have had a decade to decide i f  
t h i s  p re d ic t io n  has come t r u e ,  and i t s  t e s t  reveals  two i n t e r e s t in g  r e ­
s u l t s .  F i r s t ,  we have witnessed a marked increase  in the turnover and 
d i v e r s i t y  o f  technologica l  dev ices ,  ra is in g  the question o f  what do we 
turn to as an example o f  modern technology.  The d i f f i c u l t y  we have in 
answering the quest ion stems p re c is e ly  from the f a c t  tha t  technology  
makes obso lete  the devices i t  produces. The prec is ion  Swiss chronometer
has given way to the b a t t e r y  powered watch,  which was in turn succeeded 
by the e l e c t r o n i c  watch,  f i r s t  w i th  l i g h t - e m i t t i n g  diode d i s p la y ,  then 
w ith  l i q u i d  c ry s ta l  d is p la y .  In each case the t imepiece stood fo r  the 
highest  advancements only  to be overcome by more technological  inno­
v a t io n .  This exacerbates the problem o f  i d e n t i f y i n g  what ' technology '  
means amongst i t s  d ivergent  forms. Secondhand most important,  is the  
lack o f  evidence f o r  any "shock*" any i n a b i l i t y  to cope w i th  technology.  
I f  a nyth ing ,  we have accommodated ourselves q u i t e  n i c e l y .  I f  in f a c t  we 
have absorbed technology and accepted i t ,  what then seems to be the 
problem? On the s u r fa c e ,  noth ing.  Yet there  are s t i l l  nagging persona l ,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  and e t h ic a l  concerns which seem, however, vague and d i s t a n t .  
The f a i l u r e  o f  T o f f l e r ' s  p re d ic t io n  brings home more em phat ica l ly  the 
elusiveness o f  the problem.
I t  would be f r u i t f u l ,  then,  to begin an e x p lo ra t io n  in to  the  
problem o f  technology by s o r t in g  out i t s  d ivergent  mani fes ta t ions  w i th  
the aim toward accounting fo r  i t s  e lus iveness.
Mitcham has attempted a systematic  e x p lo ra t io n  o f  the mani­
fe s ta t io n s  p f  technology. He points  out th a t  ' technology '  has both a 
broad and narrow use,  taken Up by socia l  s c i e n t i s t s  and engineers  
r e s p e c t i v e l y . ^  For engineers technology has the s t r i c t  meaning o f  the 
process o f  m a te r ia l  con st ru c t io n ;  socia l  s c i e n t i s t s  expand th is  d e f i ­
n i t i o n  to include " . . . a l l  making o f  m ater ia l  a r t i f a c t s ,  the objects
made, t h e i r  use, toge ther  w i th  t h e i r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and s oc ia l  con-
12t e x t s . "  Though ' technology '  r e fe rs  p r i m a r i l y  to the making o f  a r t i ­
fac ts  in f luenced by modern sc ience ,  Mitcham contends th a t  ' technology '
". • • • is not a uni vocal term; i t  does not mean e x a c t ly  the same thing
in a l l  contexts .  I t  is  o f t e n ,  and in s i g n i f i c a n t  ways, context -depen­
dent— both in speech and in the w o r l d . | f  we ta k e ,  w i th  Mitcham,  
philosophy o f  technology as the attempt to give a reasoned account to  
the "na ture  and meaning o f  technology,"  then the need f o r  a phi losophy  
o f  technology becomes apparent in the need to examine and account fo r  
the breadth o f  the use o f  ' t e c h n o l o g y ' .
Mitcham provides a typology o f  technology which al lows f o r  a
systemat ic  appraisa l  o f  d e f i n i t i o n s  and d e s cr ip t ions  accounting f o r  the
• • * .  1 Ifdivergence he recognizes.
D is t in c t io n s  among technologies may be said  to 
crea te  a three dimensional  g r i d .  F i r s t  there are the  
obvious subject or  m ate r ia l  d i s t i n c t io n s  between 
chemical technology,  e l e c t r i c a l  technology,  e t c .
Second, there  are fun c t io n a l  or  s t r u c t u r a l  d i s t i n c t i o n s .
T h i r d ,  there are socia l  or  h i s t o r i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n s .  . . . .
The subject  o r  m ate r ia l  senses are c lo s e ly  a l l i g n e d  w i th  the narrow
sense o f  ' technology '  and are usua l ly  the subject  o f  i n v e s t ig a t io n  by
the socia l  sc iences .  The s t r u c t u r a l  or  func t iona l  dimens ion, proves most
f r u i t f u l  in prov id ing  fundamental d i s t i n c t io n s  necessary f o r  a d e f i n i t i o n
which under l ies  the var ious manifest ions o f  technology.
Mitcham d iv ides  th is  dimension in to  concepts which p a r a l l e l  the
standard conception o f  humans i n t e r a c t in g  w i th  the na tura l  wor ld:
human's in te rn a l  thought processes; b o d i ly  and socia l  i n t e r a c t io n  and
a c t i v i t y ;  and the r e s u l ta n t  ob jects  o f  tha t  a c t i v i t y ,  which take on
independent s ta tus  in the n a tu ra l  w or ld .  The func t iona l  concepts o f
technology,  then,  are knowledge, process,  and technologica l  ob jects  or
p r o d u c t s . ^  Mitcham emphasizes a f o u r t h  concept,  technology-as-vol  i t io n  .
This concept covers the a c t i v i t y  o f  use,  i . e . ,  to what end objects  are
6
used is determined by a w i l l .  He emphasizes t h i s  concept because the 
v o l i t i o n a l  aspect o f  human act ion  in technology is the most underformu­
l a t e d .  There is  l i t t l e  consensus as to what the w i l l  is  as a ph i losophic
17concept,  ye t  i t  is  employed in discussions o f  technology.  Skol imoski ,
f o r  ins tance ,  d is t in g u ish es  science from technology on the basis o f
sc ience 's  concern w i th  what is and technology's  shaping what is to be on
1 ftthe  basis o f  our d e s i re s .  The quest ion o f  w i l l  in technology points  to
c ru c ia l  questions about humankind's s t r i v i n g s  and a s p i r a t i o n s , the ro le
o f  technologica l  ob jec ts  in those a s p i r a t i o n s ,  and u l t i m a t e l y  about
19human nature  i t s e l f .
According to Mitcham's scheme, the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  techno­
lo g ica l  ob jects  involves  the d is t in g u is h in g  o f  var ious types o f  o b je c ts .  
Again,  t h i s  has a close r e la t io n s h ip  to  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  w i t h i n  the narrow 
sense o f  technology.  The centra l  ph i losophic  issue is "what counts as an 
a r t i f a c t  o f  technology? What d is t ingu ishe s  technological  ob jects  from 
non-technological  o b je c ts? "2^
What may be most d i s t i n c t i v e  o f  technology is the process o f  
making and using.  Mitcham f inds  process,  as the fundamental category ,  
c h a r a c t e r ! s t i c  o f  both engineers and s oc ia l  s c i e n t i s t s :  engineers s tress
making, s oc ia l  s c i e n t i s t s  u s in g .2  ̂ This c a tegory ,  then ,  covers in ­
v en t io n ,  design,  and f a b r i c a t i o n  as we l l  as the macrostructures o f  pro­
duction and socia l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  fo r  u t i 1 i z a t io n  o f  products .  Mitcham 
c i t e s  Jacques E l u l l ' s  The Technological  Socie ty  as the most compre­
hensive contemporary example o f  work in the area o f  technology as 
22process.  For E l u l l ,  modern technology is  technique which pursues
2?
e f f i c i e n c y  in a ra t io n a l  way. J What is d e c is iv e  is not the in te rn a l
s t r u c t u r e  o f  technology but the r e la t i o n  between technica l  phenomena and
s o c ie ty  manifest  in a c t i v i t y ,  socia l  o r g a n iz a t io n ,  and the t r a d i t i o n a l
2ka r t s  o f  c u l t i v a t i o n , e . g .  , medicine and education .
Technology as knowledge most c lo s e ly  a l igns  w i th  phi losophy o f  
sc ience.  The d is t in g u is h in g  f e a tu re  o f  modern technology is i t s  rooting  
in modern science.  M. Bunge and S. Carpenter recognize th a t  science is  
a necessary condi t ion fo r  the p r e s c r i p t i v e  ru les  o f  technology.  A 
s c i e n t i f i c  law in the form " I f  A, then B" is d e s c r ip t iv e  o f  r e a l i t y  in 
t h a t  a law subsumes a concrete event by way o f  specia l  c o n d i t ions .  For 
example,  laws o f  c r y s t a l l i n e  arrangement can exp la in  why, when carbon 
is added to i r o n ,  i t  becomes ha rd e r ,  by spec i fy in g  the placement o f  
carbon atoms in an iron l a t t i c e .  The p o s i t io n in g  o f  the carbon atom can 
account f o r  t e n s i l e  s t rength  and c rys ta l  1 ine f l e x i b i l i t y  in terms o f  
how the carbon a l t e r s  the packing arrangement in the l a t t i c e .  Techno­
log ica l  Rules apply s c i e n t i f i c  laws in a p r e s c r i p t i v e  way: "To get B,
do A ."  By s p e c i fy in g  the desired  resu l ts  and the re le v an t  law, the 
spec ia l  condi t ions are p re sc r ib ed .  Thus chemical bonding laws, along 
w ith  s p e c i f i c a t io n  o f  how hard one wants s te e l  tempered,  prescr ibe  how 
much carbon and heat is req u i re d .  S c i e n t i f i c  exp lanat ion  gives theo­
r e t i c a l  grounding to s k i l l s  once acquired through t r i a l  and e r r o r  and 
passed on through ap p ren t ice s h ip .  To make progress in a technologica l  
f i e l d  one employs s c i e n t i f i c  laws fo r  a r t i c u l a t i n g  successful  g e n e r a l i ­
z a t io n s .  Mitcham includes cybernetics  as in formation or systems theory  
in technology-as-knowledge since i t  is  an attempt  to give a general  
account o f  the contro l  o f  i n fo r m a t io n .2^
Mitcham's scheme o f  concepts is a ser ious attempt to cut through
d e b i l i t a t i n g  d i v e r s i t y  and reduct io n is m .“ Though th is  is not the only  
typology ,  i t  is ty p ic a l  . - in ' th a t  no problem surfaces .  With in  th is  f o r ­
mat problems may be s e t t l e d  on the basis o f  what counts as an adequate
s o lu t io n  ( the  c r i t e r i a  o f  whieh are to be worked out w i t h in  a given 
27a r e a ) .  S t i l l  what is  c ru c ia l  has yet  to be addressed as Mitcham him­
s e l f  ind.i c a te s - -h  i s s t ress  on technology as v o l i t i o n  reveals  an i n t u i t i o n
t h a t  what is  bothersome (and in s p i r in g )  about technology l i e s  here;  he
28o n ly  d e l in e a tes  the area w i th o u t  hazarding an i n v e s t ig a t io n .
This approach to a phi losophy o f  technology emerges as broad but  
t h in  and vague in e x p l i c a t in g  the fea tures  o f  technology.  Against th is  
we lay  Heidegger's  rad ica l  theme: technology is the dest in y  o f  modern
man and i t  leads to  d i s a s t e r .
Nothing d e c is iv e  emerges from a ty po log ica l  approach to tech­
nology.  Problems are thinned out by dispensing them to the various  
areas w i t h i n  the typology where they are handled in d is p a ra te  ways in 
the respect ive  areas.  Technology as a problem now becomes as d iverse  
and d isp ara te  as the typology i t s e l f :  the in s ig h t  in to  technology in
one area may be in a p p l ic a b le  or  incompat ible in another .  The employ­
ment o f  s c i e n t i f i c  laws in modern technology may help in deciding  i f  an 
a r t i f a c t  is a (modern) technologica l  dev ice ,  but the in s ig h t  bears 
l i t t l e  on the e t h ic a l  concerns o f  technology.
Such a phi losophy o f  technology lacks a d i s t i n c t  and de c is ive  
d e f i n i t i o n  o f  what technology is and what i t s  problems a re .  For 
Heidegger there  is  no quest ion as to what the problem is :  there  is the
real  p o s s i b i l i t y  th a t  technology w i l l  absorb humankind in to  i t s  frame­
work and thus wipe out any e xe rc is e  o f  human freedom. Heidegger asks:
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What is  the  essence o f  technology and human beings'  r e la t i o n  to i t?
The answers are pointed and f o r c e f u l : technology is the dest iny  o f
being and we a id  and abet the impending e c l ip s e  o f  what t r u l y  graces 
and susta ins our l i v e s .  The suggestiveness o f  Heidegger 's  in q u iry  is 
in par t  the bold contrast aga ins t  vapid in v e s t ig a t io n s  in to  the e x ­
tension o f  technology,  and in l i g h t  o f  t h i s  con trast  we would do Well to 
take note o f  Heidegger 's  thought.
His rad ica l  approach as hermeneutics and his phenomenological
29rooting  have encouraged others  to fo l lo w  s u i t .  However, Heideggerian
scholarsh ip  leaves something to be des i re d .  W. L o v i t t ' s  "Techne and
Technology," fo r  example,  merely re c a p i tu la te s  Heidegger 's  p o s i t io n  on
technology w i thout  regard to the suggestions Heidegger has f o r  o v e r -
30coming the problem o f  technology.  S i m i l a r l y  D. Ihde examines in a
phenomenological ana lys is  our d e b i l i t a t i o n  through technologvcal  devices
but does not extend h is  in q u iry  to an examination o f  in v ig o r a t in g  
31p ra x is .  The danger o f  r e c a p i t u l a t i n g  Heidegger in his own vocabulary  
is  th a t  there  is  l i t t l e  concrete meaning f o r  those not f a m i l i a r  or  
in c l in e d  toward tha t  vocabulary.
Our i n q u i r y ,  then,  should e x p l i c a t e  the problems and suggestions  
o f  Heidegger's phi losophy o f  technology in luc id  terms, i . e . ,  h is  sug­
gest ions should be a r t i c u l a t e d  such th a t  we may compare them w i th  our  
own i in tu i t ions  and observations about technologica l  l i v i n g .  Though his  
concerns may not be ours ,  i f  Heidegger 's  rad ic a l  thought is suggestive  
a t  a l l ,  we should be able to c l a r i f y  our responses to those i n t u i t i o n s  
based on those suggestions.
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To begin,  then,  l e t  us examine Heidegger 's  c la im th a t  technology
is the dest iny  o f  modern man. The l a t e r  works hold th is  as the central
theme. The essays "The Question Concerning Technology" and "The
32Turning" are the keystones in e la b o ra t in g  th is  theme. But the im­
pending e c l ip s e  o f  being must a lso be set against  the focusing power o f  
th ings where being is brought to the f o r e .  I t  is Heidegger 's  con­
te n t io n  th a t  the essence o f  technology e e l ip s es  th is  focal  power and 
we humans are accomplices in the " i n ju r io u s  neg lec t"  o f  those focal  
th ings .
2.  Heidegger 's  Mature Philosophy o f  Technology
The essence o f  technology f o r  the mature Heidegger is a revea l ing  
"which puts to  nature  the unreasonable demand tha t  i t  supply energy that  
can be e x t ra c te d  and stored as s u c h . " ^  Nature is revealed as a 
resource to be unlocked and " d i re c te d  from the beginning toward f u r ­
th e r ing  something e l s e . " ^  The re ve a l ing  o f  technology summons ( f o r d e r t  
heraus) nature  to be a resource: "Everywhere e very th in g  is ordered to
stand by, to be immediately a t  hand, indeed to stand there j u s t  so t h a t
35i t  may be on c a l l  f o r  a f u r t h e r  o r d e r in g ."  I . e . ,  resources are
secured and regulated to stand by.
In the context  o f  the in t e r lo c k in g  processes p e r ta in in g  
to the o rd e r ly  d is p o s i t io n  o f  e l e c t r i c a l  energy,  even the 
Rhine i t s e l f  appears a t  our command. The h y d r o e le c t r i c  
p la n t  is  not b u i l t  in to  the Rhine River  as was the old  
wooden bridge th a t  jo ined  bank w i th  bank f o r  hundreds o f  
years.  Rather the r i v e r  is dammed up in to  the power 
p la n t .  What the r i v e r  is now, namely,  a w ate r  power 
s u p p l i e r ,  derives from out o f  the essence o f  the power
s t a t i o n . 36
I t  is humankind which chal lenges the real  to be a resource;  
human beings d r ive  technology forward.  " B u t ,"  Heidegger says,  "the  
unconcealment i t s e l f ,  w i t h in  which order ing  un fo lds ,  is never a human 
handiwork.  . . ."37 Man is claimed by what is open to him to respond 
as he does. "The unconcealment o f  the unconcealed has a 1 ready come to 
pass whenever i t  c a l l s  man f o r t h  in to  the modes o f  reve a l in g  a l l o t e d  to  
him. When man, in h is  way, from w i th in  unconcealment reveals  tha t  which 
presences,  he merely responds to the c a l l  o f  unconcealment even when he 
c ontra d ic ts  i t . "3® The name f o r  th is  c la im ,  the d isc losure  o f  the real
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as ordered resource,  upon humans is Gestel l  or  framework. )<
The real is ordered in accordance w i th  modern science.  In 
physics ,  11 . . . nature  reports  i t s e l f  in some way o r  o ther  th a t  is 
i d e n t i f i a b l e  through c a lc u la t io n  and th a t  i t  remains o rderab le  as a 
system o f  i n f o r m a t i o n . " ^  Though technology uses science,  science is 
in f a c t  the hera ld  o f  the essence o f  technology.  The representa t ion  of  
the r e a T  (as c a lc u lab le )  is  the framework which is the essence o f  
technology.
On the s u r fa c e ,  then ,  technology appears to be simply a human
a c t i v i t y .  What re fu te s  technology as merely in s t ru m en ta l ,  however, as
merely a means to an end, is th a t  the essence o f  technology lays c la im
to humans. Humans order  nature  as resource in order  to accomplish ends;
but n a tu re ,  i . e . ,  the  r e a l ,  revea ls  i t s e l f  as something to be ordered.
The framework places humans in the p o s i t io n  " to  reveal  the r e a l ,  in the
kOmode o f  o rd e r in g  as" resource.  The kind o f  d isc losure  which claims
humans to stand in t h i s  es s e n t ia l  realm is a d e s t in in g :  the framework
sends human beings in to  th is  way o f  re v e a l in g .
Yet Heidegger maintains humans do have freedom.
But th a t  d e s t i n i n g - i s  never a f a t e  tha t  compels. For 
man becomes t r u l y  f r e e  only  in so fa r  as he belongs to  
the realm o f  d e s t in in g  and so becomes one who l i s t e n s  
and hears,  and not one who is simply constrained to 
obey.^I
Freedom governs the open in the sense o f  the  
cleared and l ig h te d  up, i . e . ,  o f  the revea led .  . . .
Freedom is tha t  which conceals in a way th a t  opens 
to l i g h t ,  in whose c le a r in g  there  shimmers th a t  v e i l  
tha t  covers what comes to presence o f  a l l  t r u t h  and 
l e t s  the v e i l  appear as what v e i l s .  •
Doxographical ly p u t ,  Heidegger says th a t  human freedom is bounded
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by and made sense o f  in c on tra s t  to the revea l ing  which "holds sway 
over  him,"  which claims him. The framework c a l l s  humans, but humans 
come to hear and l i s t e n .  The a b i l i t y  " to  hear and l i s t e n "  is the arena 
o f  freedom. But d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r is e  when Heidegger says tha t  the frame­
work grants humans e n t ry  in to  the open, in to  the d isc losure  o f  the 
**3revea led .
The danger o f  technology is twofo ld:  F i r s t ,  when every th ing  is
ordered as resource,  every th ing  th a t  humans encounter e x is t s  only  inso­
f a r  as i t  is tha t  const ruc t ;  second, fo r  lack o f  "standing out"  e ve ry ­
th ing  is  lev e led  to resource and men w i l l  take themselves as a 
kkresource.  The framework v e i 1s revea l ing  as such, f o r  order in g  is
seen as the only and unquestionable mode o f  dea l ing  w i th  r e a l i t y .
But the danger,  namely,  being i t s e l f  endangering i t s e l f  
in the t r u t h  o f  i t s  coming to presence remains v e i le d  
and d isguised.  This d isgu is ing  is what is most danger­
ous in the d a n g e r . ^5
But i t  is in t h i s  heightened danger tha t  "the  saving power grows."
The rad ica l  and disguised c los ing o f f  o f  o ther  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  grants
humans the oppor tu n i ty  to gain t h e i r  highest d i g n i t y .
This d i g n i t y  l i e s  in keeping watch over the unconceal-  
ment--and w i th  i t ,  from the f i r s t ,  the concealment— o f  
a l l  coming to presence on t h i s  e a r t h ,  I t  is p r e c is e ly  
in the framework which threatens to sweep man away in to  
order in g  as the supposed s in g le  way o f  r e v e a l in g ,  and 
so thrusts  man in to  the danger o f  the surrender  o f  his  
f re e  essence — i t  i s . p r e c i s e l y  t h is  extreme danger that  
the innermost in d e s t r u c t i b l e  belongingness o f  man w i th in  
granting  may come to l i g h t .  . .
C le a r ly  the framework o f  o rder ing  is not i t s e l f  th a t  which al lows  
man to  guard o th e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  re v e a l in g .  But the framework h a r ­
bors the saving power in s o fa r  as i t  contrasts  w i th  what is being
o b l i t e r a t e d .  The reve a l ing  o f  the framework disguises i t s e l f  by
o b l i t e r a t i n g  any c o n tra s t in g  modes o f  d is c lo s u re .  But as the c losing
o f f  o f  o th e r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  revea l ing  nears we have a f la sh in g  glance
o f  what is l o s t .  '
When o b l i v io n  turns about ,  when world as the safekeeping  
o f  the coming to presence o f  being turns i n ,  then there  
comes to  pass the in - f l a s h in g  o f  world in to  the in ju r io u s  
neglec t  o f  the t h i n g . ^7
Only when in s ig h t  brings i t s e l f  d is c lo s in g ly  to pass , 
only when the coming to presence o f  technology l i g h t s  up 
as framework, do we d iscern how, in the ordering  o f  
resource,  the t r u t h  o f  being remains denied as wor ld .
Only then do we not ice  tha t  a l l  mere w i l l i n g  and doing 
in the mode o f  o rder ing  s t e a d f a s t l y  p e r s is ts  in in ju r io u s  
n e g le c t .  °
In n e g lec t ing  th in g s ,  man neglects  the world in the dimensions o f  
e a r t h ,  sky,  m o r ta ls ,  and d i v i n i t i e s . ^ 9  a th ing  focuses these dimensions 
in what Heidegger c a l l s  the m ir ro rp la y  o f  the f o u r f o l d .  In his  
d e s c r ip t io n  o f . a  jug he shows how each dimension is drawn together  and 
then r e f l e c t e d  in the o th ers .  The jug holds the w ine ,  f r u i t  o f  the 
v in e ,  planted in the s o i 1, soaking ra ins from the sky. Mortals who 
walk on e a r t h ,  under the sky,  d r in k  the wine in l i b a t io n s  to the gods.
I t  is in the m i r ro rp la y  o f  these dimensions th a t  man meets his own 
essence: he guards the world as i t  is focused in a th in g .  For he too
is drawn in the focus o f  a th in g .  By ne g lec t in g  the d isc losure  o f  
t h in g s ,  man neglects  his essence and u l t i m a t e l y  h im s e l f .
Questions remain as to the nature o f  the revea l ing  o f  technology  
and i t s  r e la t i o n  to human act ion  (and u l t i m a t e l y  human d i g n i t y ) .  D is ­
c losure  makes something p resent ,  but there is a strong and weak sense 
o f  what i t  is to make present .  In the weak sense,  making present  means
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th a t  what was once hidden comes out o f  the background and in to  the 
f o r e ;  in the strong sense,  what is revealed is c o n s t i tu te d  in some
Kantian fa s h io n ,  i . e . ,  the framework molds an amorphous s t u f f  such tha t
the real  could not be o th e r  than resource.
Heidegger c l e a r l y  wants to r e je c t  the not ion tha t  we are mere 
slaves to  technology,  but n e i t h e r  do we have unbr id led  freedom in i t s  
employment. Between these extremes,  then,  in what sense does technology
reveal? We are  asking f o r  a c l a r i f i c a t  ion o f  what Heidegger means by
holding sway: to what e x te n t  our freedom is unbounded, and what and
where the o p p o r tu n i t ie s  are to "hear  and l i s t e n . "  The weak sense o f  
making present is too weak f o r  Heidegger as i t  resembles the i n s t r u ­
mental approach to technology: technology merely h ig h l ig h ts  things in
ways h i t h e r t o  unforseen. But the strong sense impl ies some s o r t  o f  
c o n s t r a in t  " t o  obey": o rd e r in g ,  making the r e a l ,  implies t h a t  the
framework al lows us only  to see the real  as resource so long as i t  
"holds sway" over us,  the real  j_s_ resource; we have no choice as to how 
to a t tend  to the real  and there  is no occasion f o r  human d i g n i t y .
How, then,  do we as humans exerc ise  the d i g n i t y  tha t  is ours?
In the "Question Concerning Technology" Heidegger only  suggests tha t  
we can in f a c t  exe rc is e  tha t  d i g n i t y ;  in "The Thing" he shows us what 
and how a th ing  may d is c lo s e .  But these are only two bold and v iv i d  
penstrokes in the sketch.  Heidegger 's  suggestions f a i l  to i l lu m in a te  in 
a f u l l e r  way the area where human d i g n i t y  and the focal  power o f  things  
coalesce and act  as a counter fo rce  to the in ju r io u s  n eg lec t  in the  
framework o f  technology.
3* The Context o f  Technology in Being and Time
Being and Time, as Heidegger's i n i t i a l  major work,  is a broader  
i n q u i r y  in i t s  scope and, I b e l i e v e ,  can f i l l  out and h i g h l i g h t  the  
suggestions and answer the questions ra ised in the mature works.  I t  
is  h is  phi losophy in the making in th a t  i t  approaches,  program m at ica l ly ,  
the meaning o f  ' b e i n g 1. By seeking the meaning o f  'b e ing '  w i t h in  the 
context o f  the tempora l ,  Heidegger sets h im se l f  o f f  aga inst  previous  
phi losophica l  th in k e rs .  The scope o f  the book addresses i t s e l f  not only  
to e s ta b l is h ed  scholarsh ip  but a lso attempts to incorporate  the concrete  
meaning o f  'b e i n g 1. Thus Being and Time proves h e lp fu l  in tha t  i t  f i l l s  
out Heidegger 's  p o s i t ion  e m p i r i c a l l y  and i nd i cates where tha t  p o s i t io n  
is located in terms o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  ph i losophica l  problems.
But seeing t h a t  Heidegger abandoned the d i r e c t io n  and s t y l e  o f  
thought developed in Being and Time, what sense would i t  make to return  
to t h i s  work? I t  is obvious enough t h a t  Being and Time provides a
counterpoint f o r  Heidegger h im se l f :  he never completed the book, his
\
mature works take the form o f  essays,  he abandons the foundational  
approach in favor  o f  e x p l o r a t i o n .  I turn to Being and Time because i t  
can provide background f o r  h is  s t r i k i n g  but c r y p t i c  suggest ions,  f o r  i t  
is here Heidegger attempts an e lu c id a t io n  o f  r e la t io n s  between human 
beings and t h e i r  world and the things in i t .  .T h e  accent he places on 
the world provides the context :  I t  is in terms o f  the world and i t s
r e la t io n s  t h a t  we can ask in what s e t t i n g  we as humans have occasion to  
e xerc ise  our d i g n i t y  in regards to th in g s ,  what and where we have
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  fo r  technology,  how the framework orders the real f o r  us 
in regards to science.
To be sure,  Being and Time is not w i thout  i t s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and 
quest ions.  Hence both the mature works and Being and Time should cast  
l i g h t  on each o t h e r ,  h ig h l i g h t i n g  in a f u l l e r  manner the suggestions  
Heidegger makes. But we must a lso be aware o f  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  the 
suggestions themselves.
In Being and Time Heidegger wishes to work out c oncre te ly  the 
meaning o f  b e i n g . T h e  meaning o f  being had been neglected in the past  
because the t r a d i t i o n  thought i t  u n iv e r s a l ,  s e l f - e v i d e n t  or undef inab le .  
But none o f  these presupposit ions  is h e l p f u l ,  f o r  the concept o f  being  
remains i n e x p l i c i t  and thus ignored.  Heidegger,  then,  in order to break 
the  complacency o^ the t r a d i t i o n  c a l l s  f o r  a renewed in v e s t ig a t io n  in to  
the meaning o f  being.  He argues tha t  w i thout  e x p l i c i t  understanding o f
being the e x p l i c a t io n  o f  the being o f  e n t i t i e s  cannot be c l e a r l y  known.
The question o f  being aims th e re fo re  a t  a sc e r ta in in g  
the  a p r i o r i  condi t ions  not only f o r  the p o s s ib i1i t y  o f  
the sciences which examine e n t i t i e s  as e n t i t i e s  o f  such
and such a ty p e ,  and, in so do ing , a lready  operate  w i th
an understanding o f  be ing ,  but a lso f o r  the p o s s i b i l i t y
o f  those onto log ies  themselves which are p r i o r  to the
o n t ic a l  sciences and which provide t h e i r  fbundat ions .
Basi c a l i y , a l 1 o n to lo g y , no matter how r ich  and f i  rmly 
compacted a_ system o f  categor ies  i t  has a t  i t s  disposal  , 
remains b l in d  and perver ted  from I t s  own a im , j_f j_t_ has 
not f i  rs t  adequately  clar?  f?ed the meaning o f  b e in g , and 
cor|cei  ved th? s c l a r i  f i  ca t ion  as i ts fundamental t a s k . 51
Foundational  phi losophy,  as Heidegger's  program in Being and Time,
aims a t  the c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  the meaning o f  be ing ,  and in the process,
anchors in th is  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  the formula t ion  of  the basic  concepts fo r
research in the sciences.
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Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an 
understanding beforehand o f  the area o f  s u b je c t -m a t te r  
under ly ing  a l l  the ob jects  a science takes as i t s  
theme, and a l l  p o s i t i v e  in v e s t ig a t io n  is guided. Only 
a f t e r  the area i t s e l f  has been explored beforehand in 
a corresponding manner do these concepts become 
genuinely  demonstrated.52
Foundational  phi losophy grounds a p a r t i c u l a r  science by d e l im i t i n g  the
area  to be s tudied as w e l l  as prov id ing the concepts which are used to
e x p l i c a t e  tha t  area .  But more c o n cre te ly ,  what is the ground o f  these
concepts?
T h i s , o f  course , is the task undertaken in Being and Time.
Heidegger turns tq  human being in order  to gain access to the meaning o f
be ing.  Humans stand out as beings since they can ra ise  the question o f
being: humans understand b e in g . ^  To denote the d is t in c t iv e n e s s  o f
human beings,  Heidegger uses the term Dasein , l i t e r a l l y  b e in g - th e r e .
The import o f  th is  locut ion  becomes c le a r  when we recognize ,  as Heidegger
would have us do,  thathumans belong e s s e n t i a l l y  in a wor ld .  Thus to be
human ?s to be there  in a wor ld .  11 . . .  Dasein ' s understanding o f
being p e r ta ins  w i th  equal p r i m o r d i a l i t y •both to an understanding o f
something l i k e  a 'w o r ld 1 , and to the understanding o f  the being o f  those
5ke n t i t i e s  which become access ib le  w i th in  the  w o r ld ."
Dasein f in d s  i t s e l f  always and a l ready  w i th in  a wor ld .  Thus the  
ground pointed to by humans is being in the w o r ld ,  concre te ly  and 
r i c h l y .  The meaning o f  being is to be found in the fu l ln e s s  o f  the 
w or ld .  To e x h i b i t  tha t  fu l ln e s s  Heidegger f i r s t  turns, to our everyday  
deal ings  which are close a t  hand. Our deal ings take place w i th in  an 
environment (an Umweit o r ,  l i t e r a l l y ,  an around world)  wherein the
e n t i t i e s  we encounter take on meaning in terms o f  th a t  environment.  The
19
e n t i t i e s  we encounter in our deal ings  are equipment,  and the being o f  
equipment is r e a d y - t o - h a n d . T h e  s t r u c tu r e  o f  the being o f  what is 
ready-to-hand as equipment is determined by references and assignments.  
The f r u i t f u l n e s s  o f  Heidegger 's  po in t  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  through an 
ana lys is  o f  a spoke wrench. A piece o f  s o l id  hexagonal bar s tock ,  
w ith  a s l i t  on one face an e i g h t - o f - a n - inch wide cut h a l f  way through 
the bar and having two t h r e e - q u a r t e r  inch small diameter rods welded 
perpend icu lar  to  the s l i t  c re a t in g  a cross member, describes a spoke 
wrench in the context  o f  b ic y c le  r e p a i r .  The width o f  the s l i t  has 
re fe rence to the width o f  the r idge a t  the end nut o f  a spoke. An un­
t rue  wheel c a l l s  a t t e n t io n  to i t s  need o f  r e p a i r  w i th  annoying v ib r a t io n  
when r id i n g .  The untrue wheel re fe rs  to the spoke wrench as the tool  to 
carry  out the needed r e p a i r .
The apprehension o f  the world around us,  by which we guide and 
manipulate equipment, Heidegger c a l l s  c ircumspection.  Circumspection 
is concernful  in th a t  one apprehends the world w i th  an eye toward the 
ready-to-hand and the r e la t i o n  of  i t s  assignments and re ferences.  What 
is important to recognize is the richness w i th  which circumspection  
views: the fu l ln e s s  o f  the world is always w i t h in  the purview o f  c i r ­
cumspection s ince  the ready-to-hand is re la te d  to o ther  e n t i t i e s  in a 
r e f e r e n t i a l  con text .  Equipment always operates w i th in  a t o t a l i t y  o f  
equi pment:
Equipment is e s s e n t i a l l y  'something i n - o r d e r - t o .  . . . '
A t o t a l i t y  o f  equipment is c o n s t i tu te d  by var ious ways o f  
the ' i n - o r d e r - t o , '  such as s e r v i c e a b i l i t y ,  conduciveness,  
u s a b i l i t y ,  m an ip u lab i1i t y .
In the ' i n - o r d e r - t o '  as a s t r u c tu r e  there l i e s  an 
assignment or  reference o f  something to something.57
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The e x p l i c i t  view o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  assignment i l lu m in a te s  the context
o f  th a t  assignment; hence,  the world announces i t s e l f  as the t o t a l i t y
58which provides the context  fo r  the assignment.
To use a piece o f  equipment is a lready  to have an understanding
of the use o f  th a t  p a r t i c u l a r  piece o f  equipment,  where i t s  use is
a p p ro p r ia te ,  and o f  what end i t  serves.  The c harac te r  o f  equipment,
then,  is involvement:
. . . the s t ru c tu re  o f  l e t t i n g  i t  be involved impl ies  
th a t  t h is  is an involvement which something h a s - -an 
involvement w h ic h ' is  w i th  something. Dasein always 
assigns i t s e l f  from a " fo r - t h e - s a k e - o f - w h ic h "  to the  
"with -which"  o f  an involvement,  th a t  is to say,  to the 
e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s ,  i t  always l e t s  e n t i t i e s  be encountered  
as ready-to -hand.  . . . The "where-in"  o f  an act  o f  
understanding which assigns or  r e fe rs  i t s e l f ,  is th a t  
f o r  which one le ts  e n t i t i e s  be encountered in the kind  
o f  Being tha t  belongs to involvements; and th is  "where­
in" is the phenomena o f  the w o r ld .59
When Dasein circumspect?vely  involves i t s e l f  w i th  equipment i t
f inds i t s e l f  " th e re "  in the w or ld .  The " th e re "  is in d i c a t i v e  o f  the
d isc losure  o f  the wor ld .
In terms o f  the s ig n i f ic a n c e  which is disclosed in under­
standing the w o r ld ,  concernful  Be ing-a long-s ide  the ready-  
to-hand gives i t s e l f  to  understand whatever involvement  
tha t  which is encountered can have.  To say th a t  "circum­
spection discovers"  means tha t  the 'w o r ld 1 which has a l ­
ready been understood comes to be i n t e r p r e t e d .  The ready-  
to-hand comes e x p l i c ? t l y  in to  the s ig h t  which understands.
. . .. That which is e x p l i c i t l y  understood . . . has the  
s t r u c tu r e  o f  something as something. The c ircumspect ive  
question as to what th is  p a r t i c u l a r  th in g  that  is ready-  
to-hand may be,  receives the c ircum spect ive ly  i n t e r p r e t i v e  
answer t h a t  i t  is f o r  such and such a purpose.  0
The hexagonal bar stock serves as a spoke wrench when I understand how
i t  f i t s  the spoke nut and when a wheel needs to be t ru e d .  Heidegger is
not saying th a t  we o v e r la y  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and understanding on an
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e n t i t y ;  ra th e r  the e n t i t y  is a lready  re ad y - to -h an d : we i n t e r p r e t  i t  as
a tool  to t igh ten  spokes on the basis o f  our understanding how spokes 
p u l l  on the rim and o f  the s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  a r o l l i n g  wheel .
Against the background o f  s ig n i f ic a n c e  and involvement in the 
w or ld ,  Heidegger argues science is a d e r iv a t i v e  way o f  tak ing up w i th  
the wor ld .  The view o f  the world science gives us is tha t  o f  the 
presence-at -hand o f  e n t i t i e s ,  a view which shows a d i s t i n c t i v e  lack o f  
concern fo r  the s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  the wor ld .  Science is a theory ,  to be 
sure,  i . e . ,  i t  does give us a v is ion  o f  r e a l i t y  and o f  how r e a l i t y  f i t s  
to g e th e r .  Indeed, sc ience 's  task is to study e n t i t i e s  as ob jects  and 
t h e i r  r e la t i o n  to one another .  B u t ."  . . .  by look ing a t  the world  
th e o re t i  cal I y , we have a lready  dimmed 11 down to the un i fo rm i ty  o f  what 
is  pure ly  p re se n t -a t -h a n d ,  though adm it ted ly  th is  u n i fo rm i ty  comprises 
a new abundance o f  things which can be discovered by simply c h a ra c te r ­
i z in g  th e m ." ^
The p iv o t  f o r  Heidegger is presence-at -hand as i t  contrasts  with  
our involvement w i th  th ings  ready-to -hand.  When e n t i t i e s  are re a d y - to -  
hand we view them w i th  c ircumspect ive concern; when e n t i t i e s  are p resent -  
at-hand we "merely stand beside them," i . e . ,  we do not take up w i th  them
in terms o f  a reference to s ig n i f i c a n c e .  E n t i t i e s  which are p r e s e n t - a t -
62hand are  i n d i f f e r e n t  as regards t h e i r  r e la t i o n  to Dase i n . By not i n ­
vo lv ing  ourselves w i th  e n t i t i e s ,  they do not simply d isappear ,  but i t  
makes no d i f fe r e n c e  to us which e n t i t y  we are beside since t h e i r  presence 
is seen as the same. We could be beside any e n t i t y :  there is no ass ign­
ment to s ig n i f ic a n c e  because the r e f e r e n t i a l  context  is not susta ined.  
Dasein , however, never operates w i thout  some concern,  a l b e i t  a p r i v a t i v e
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one. There is simply no c ircumspect ive concern w i th  e n t i t i e s  taken up 
as p rese n t -a t -h an d .
Knowledge e xe m p l i f ie s  both the d e r iv a t i v e  character  o f  being  
■alo n g s id e -en t i t ies -as  wel l  as the primordi  al i ty  o f  the b e i n g - i n - t h e -  
world wi th  the ready-to -hand.  Formally ,  knowledge is considered to be a 
r e la t i o n  between subject and o b j e c t . ^  This re la t io n s h ip  holds d i f f i -  
, c u l t i e s  so Tong as the s u b je c t 's  a b i l i t y  and capac i ty  to know remains 
u n c l a r i f i e d .  But whenever and however phi losophy turns i t s  a t t e n t i o n  to 
the s u b j e c t , phi losophy abandons the w o r ld .  In s idestepping and aban­
doning the world and Dasein1s involvement in i t ,  phi losophy is the t r a ­
d i t i o n a l  problem o f  Descartes and Kant.  Descartes'  problem o f  the e x ­
te rna l  wor ld  could only a r i s e  where Dasein withdraws from the world  
(thus break ing a p r im o r id ia l  r e l a t i o n  between Dasein and i t s  context )
f.L
and the iso la te d  subject  t r i e s  to piece together  the fragments.  n But 
the fragments are taken as p re sent -a t -hand:  Dasein is merely a long­
side e n t i t i e s ,  and nothing o f  the world is disclosed in i t s  s ig n i f i c a n c e .  
I f ,  however, we presuppose t h a t  Dasein is a lready  in the w o r ld ,  then 
Dasein's capac i ty  f o r  knowledge is  c l a r i f i e d  in i t s  involvement wi th  
e n t i t i e s .  Dasein a lready  understands and is open to the world when i t  
is invo lved.  Thus Dasein does not have to step out o f  the world and 
then return in order  to know i t .  But Dasein may choose to stand a long­
side e n t i t i e s :  Dasein, . then,  has neglected involvement but th is  is not  
a withdrawal from the world on the order o f  Cartesian doubt.  " In  t h i s ,  
kind o f  ' d w e l l i n g 1 as a ho id ing-onese1f-back from any manipulat ion or  
u t i l i z a t i o n ,  the percept ion o f  the present -a t -hand  is consummated."^
For Heidegger the development o f  th is  l i n e  o f  thought makes
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f e r t i l e  the " t h e o r e t i c a l  s c ie n c e ,"  most e x p l i c i t  in mathematical  
science.
. . . The paradigmatic  charac te r  o f  mathematical  
natura l  science does not l i e  in i t s  e x a c t i tu d e  or  
in the f a c t  th a t  i t  is binding fo r  'Everyman'; i t  
consists  ra th e r  in the fa c t  th a t  the e n t i t i e s  which 
i t  takes as i t s  theme are  discovered in i t  in the  
only way in which e n t i t i e s  can be discove red--by  
the p r i o r  p ro je c t io n  o f  t h e i r  s t a t e  o f  Be ing .66
This p r i o r  p ro je c t io n  is tha t  o f  p r e s e n t - a t -h a n d . Science as both a
v is io n  o f  the real  and the foundation o f  knowledge s t r i p s  e n t i t i e s  o f
t h e i r  wo.rldhood by reducing them t o  the s ta tus  o f  p re se n t -a t -h a n d ,
desp i te  th is  being a p r i v a t i v e  mode.
We can sharpen t h i s  p o in t  by using space as an i l l u s t r a t i o n  and
by d is t in g u is h in g  between l i v e d  vs.  Cartesian space,  in science the
pre se nt -a t -hand  becomes the theme o f  our concern: e n t i t i e s  are only
looked a t .  Two re s u l ts  fo l lo w  from t h i s :  the tool  c harac te r  o f  an
e n t i t y  is overlooked (and w i th  i t  the r e f e r e n t i a l  t o t a l i t y  o f  the w o r l d ) ,
and the e n t i t y ' s  place ( in  the context  o f  the world)  is now a matter  o f
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i n d i f f e r e n c e . ^  An e n t i t y  is now located in a three-d imensional  space.
That e n t i t y  could be located anywhere e ls e  in tha t  space,  or any o ther
e n t i t y  could take i t s  p o s i t io n .  H e i d e g g e r  argues th a t  locat ion  in
what is here c a l le d  Cartesian space can only  a r i s e  from the context o f
what we can c a l l  l ive d  space. That is to say,  Cartesian space is
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founded on l iv e d  space. Equipment belongs in a p la c e ,  i . e . ,  in v o lv e ­
ment w i th  equipment gains the o r i e n t a t i o n  o f  i t s  use from a contextual  
t o t a l i t y .  S c i e n t i f i c  space could only  a r is e  from w i t h i n  a world c lo s e -  
by.
2k
The homogeneous space o f  Nature shows i t s e l f  only  
when the e n t i t i e s  we encounter are discovered in 
such a way th a t  the w o r ld ly  c harac te r  o f  the ready-  
to-hand gets s p e c ? f ic a l l y  deprived o f  i t s  w o r ld -  
hood.69
S c i e n t i f i c  space reduces the place of  e n t i t i e s  to a g r id  where the 
r e f e r e n t i a l  bonds o f  those e n t i t i e s  are broken and one is now f r e e  to 
interchange any one e n t i t y  w i th  another .
The p ro je c t  o f  Being and Time is foundat ional  in the sense th a t  
science is  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  and thus founded on— being f u l l y  in the wor ld .  
We must remember t h a t  Being and Time seeks the a p r i o r i  condi t ions  fo r  
the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a science,  and these a p r i o r i  c o n d i t io n s ,  are in one 
sense, f o r m a l , i . e . ,  they d e l i m i t  the area a science may operate  in by 
d e f in in g  and a r t i c u l a t i n g  the basic  concepts w i th  which a science d ea ls .  
Heidegger,  then,  wants a strong sense o f  fo u n d at io n a l :  the o n to lo g ic a l
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  o f  Dasein's being in the world are the antecedent con­
d i t io n s  to which the  sciences turn f o r  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  o f  any problems 
they have regarding t h e i r  areas o f  in v e s t i g a t i o n .  Just as genet ics  is  
founded on molecular b io lo g y ,  o r  geometry on axiomatic  systems, so too 
are the sciences founded upon Dasein's b e i n g - in - t h e - w o r ld .  Without  
molecular b io lo g y ,  genetics  would be unc lear  in i t s  explanations o f  the 
mechanisms which b r ing  about changes in the gene pool.  Comparisons o f  
d i f f e r e n t  geometries would be imperspicuous w i th o u t  re ference to an 
axiom at ic  system. By tu rn ing  to molecular b io lo g y ,  we see how a system 
o f  recombination between c e r ta in  molecules produces changes in genet ic  
make up. There can be a l im i t e d  number o f  these molecules,  but as 
molecular b io logy shows, the number o f  possib le  combinations appl ies  
not only  to human genet ics  but to o ther  1i vi ng beings as w e l l .  As a
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formal system molecular  b io logy  supports a study o f  genetics  across a l l  
species o f  l i f e .  In geometry an axiomatic  system al lows us to compare 
various meanings o f  basic  concepts,  such as p o i n t ,  l i n e ,  and p lane ,  
w h i le  making sense o f  t h e i r  meaning in Eucl idean and non-Euclidean  
geometries a l i k e .  The comparison is made by r e f e r r i n g  back to a general
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axiomatic  system and seeing how the concepts and act ions d i f f e r  in t h e i r  
functions  w i th in  a given geometry.  The formal system al lows fo r  such 
co m p ar is o n s .^  Analogously,  the formal s t r u c tu r e  o f  Dasein 's being in 
the world is the ground f o r  the sciences.
Heidegger l a t e r  abandons the notion tha t  the sciences take t h e i r  
cue from philosophy but s t i l l  r e ta in s  i m p l i c i t l y  the notion that  science  
is  d e r i v a t i v e .  Science,  in i t s  essence,  is c a l c u l a t i v e - r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  
and is the hera ld  ofmodern technology.  The contra s t  in the mature 
Heidegger is  between the focusing power o f  things and sc ience 's  c a lc u -  
l a t i v e  na ture  ra th e r  than the formal s t r u c tu r e  o f  Dasein's  being in the 
world and the view o f  r e a l i t y  deprived o f  i t s  worldhood as given by 
science.  The c ru c ia l  quest ion to ask in regards to the nature o f  
technology is whether o r  not Heidegger's  c h a r a c t e r i z a t io n  o f  sc ience,  
as e i t h e r  d e r iv a t i v e  o r  c a l c u l a t i v e ,  is a f a i r  appraisa l  o f  sc ience.
Just what is science and what is i t s  r e la t io n  to technology? Does 
science in f a c t  neg lec t  things as Heidegger has i t  in Being and Time, 
or  decompose and d isp lace  things as the mature Heidegger has i t?
To begin l e t  us d is t in g u is h  three senses o f  science:  science as
a body o f  laws; the human a c t i v i t y  o r  e n te r p r is e  o f  f in d in g  those laws; 
and the a p p l ic a t io n  o f  those laws. Science is most recognizable  in the 
l a t t e r  two senses. Our educational  as wel l  as research i n s t i t u t i o n s
embody science as the a c t i v i t y  o f  apply ing s c i e n t i f i c  laws. Experiments 
are  c a r r ie d  out in order  to in d o c t r in a te  students in the ways o f  
s c i e n t i f i c  research.  Students learn how to formulate  experiments on the 
basis  o f  known laws and what counts as v a l i d a t i o n  o f  a law in the e x p e r i ­
mental procedure.  A pp l ic a t io n  o f  laws may encompass a wider  domain than 
use in an experiment;  laws p r e d ic t  behavior and on the basis o f  a p re ­
d ic t io n  a researcher can ad just  c e r t a in  knowns to ob ta in  a desired  
r e s u l t .  I w i l l  e la b o ra te  th is  p a r t i c u l a r  use o f  s c i e n t i f i c  law l a t e r .
For now l e t  us recognize th a t  a body o f  laws is the centra l  sense o f  
science in th a t  the l a t t e r  two senses r e ly  on i t .  The question f o r  us,  
then,  is what is the r e l a t i o n  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  laws, th in g s ,  and technology?
S c i e n t i f i c  explanat ions  take deductive-nomological  form; tha t  is 
to  say,  a s c i e n t i f i c  law exp la ins  an event by subsuming i t  by way o f  
i n i t i a l  c o n d i t ions .  The more general  the formula t ion  o f  the law, the  
broader the scope o f  a p p l ic a t io n  becomes. The most general  laws should 
apply to a l l  things in want o f  e x p la n a t io n .  A p a r t i c u l a r  oak t r e e  may 
be analyzed in terms o f  the c e l l u l a r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  the bark ,  the leaves ,  
xylem and phloem. We may sharpen our ana lys is  by examining the s t r u c tu r e  
o f  each o f  the var ious  c e l l s  by employing the p r in c ip le s  o f  molecular  
b io lo g y;  o r  s t i l l  more p r e c is e ly  by tu rn ing  to the laws o f  b iochem is t ry ,  
biophys ics ,  and, a t  bottom, subatomic p a r t i c l e s .  In the realm of  sub­
atomic p a r t i c l e s  we gain the most prec is ion  in regards to e x p la n a t io n .
The laws o f  p a r t i c l e  physics d e l im i t  what is possib le  in physical  
r e a l i t y .  No event in physical  space may be placed outs ide  the bounds 
o f  what the laws prescr ibe  since a l l  physical  events may be described  
by the movement o f  t h e i r  subatomic. p a r t i c l e s . By recogniz ing th a t
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events must be placed w i t h i n  the network o f  p a r t i c l e  physics ,  the laws 
o f  subatomic physics d e l i m i t  a p o s s i b i l i t y  space f o r  a l l  events .  That 
i s ,  no physical  event may occur outs ide  the purview o f  these laws, hence 
any possib le  physical  event is possib le  only  w i t h i n  the bounds o f  these 
laws. The laws, then,  describe  a p o s s i b i l i t y  space fo r  physical  events .  
For example,  the laws o f  r e l a t i v i t y  s t a t e  th a t  the speed o f  l i g h t  is 
constant f o r  a l l  observers and co n s t i tu te s  a l i m i t  f o r  the v e l o c i t y  o f  
o b je c t s .  The laws descr ibe a p o s s i b i l i t y  space wherein one could not 
t r a v e l  a t  the speed o f  l i g h t  and where one's mass would be seen as i n ­
creasing r e l a t i v e  to a " s t a t i o n a r y "  observer ,  i f  we were to ld  o f  an 
event  where t ra v e l  was f a s t e r  than the speed o f  l i g h t  we would have to 
say e i t h e r  tha t  is impossible o r  consider i t  a contest ing  o f  the law, 
in which case we would demand f u r t h e r  evidence and e x p l a n a t i o n . ^
But a t  the most p rec ise  leve l  o f  e x p la n a t io n ,  th a t  o f  subatomic 
p a r t i c l e s ,  the laws cover o r  apply i n d i f f e r e n t l y  to anything whatever .  
More p rec ise  laws increase the extension o f  the set  o f  things to which 
the laws may apply.  We can see th is  in terms o f  laws descr ib ing  a 
p o s s i b i 1i t y  space. Boyle 's  law d e s c r ib e s , in g e n e ra l ,  the behavior o f  
gases. We may exp la in  the b o i l in g  over o f  a cof fee  pot l e f t  unattended.  
Pressure increased because o f  an increase in temperature (due to the 
prolonged stay  on the burner)  in a confined volume (the cof fee  p o t ) .  
Pressure increased to  the po int where i t  would e x e r t  enough force  to 
l i f t  the l i d  o f  the cof fee  pot;  pressure was released ( i . e . ,  decreased) 
when breaking the seal  o f  the conta iner  increased the a v a i l a b l e  volume.  
Boyle 's  law does not e xp T a in , however,  the expansion o f  the metal o f  the 
c o n ta in e r  dur ing t h i s  event .  Here we must turn to laws governing s o l id s .
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Each type o f  law describes what may be possib le  under the purview o f  the  
respect ive  laws; in turn  these p o s s ib i1 i t y  spaces must f a l l  w i th in  the  
p o s s i b i l i t y  space o f  a l l  physical  events .  Indeed, we may draw together  
the d is p ara te  exp lana t ions  under one set  o f  laws, say tha t  o f  k i n e t i c  
motion.  But here the law is i n d i f f e r e n t  as regards which atom or  mole­
cule is being descr ibed.  The law app l ies  e q u a l ly  wel l  to the water  mole­
cule  being b o i led  f o r  co f fe e  or the iron atom in the l a t t i c e  o f  the 
cof fee  pot.  Though we must recognize to some ex ten t  the context o f  
exp lana t ion  (an iron atom's being p a r t  o f  a l a t t i c e  network w i l l  be p a r t  
o f  the i n i t i a l  condi t ions  and thus be d is t in g u ish ed  from a water  mole­
c u l e ) ,  the laws remain i n d i f f e r e n t  because they descr ibe a p o s s i b i l i t y  
space,  i . e . ,  an e xp lana t ion  o f  e i t h e r  an iron atom or  a water  molecule  
or  a whole r a f t  o f  o ther  molecular  and atomic a c t i v i t i e s .  The p oss i ­
b i l i t y  space o f  subatomic p a r t i c l e s  is most i n d i f f e r e n t  since the 
extension o f  the set  described by the laws o f  subatomic a c t i v i t y  is a l l  
physical  events .
What is l o s t ,  o f  course,  are  the molar aspects o f  what we are  
subsuming, and the exp lana t ion  o f  molar behavior in terms o f  subatomic 
p a r t i c l e s ,  though p re c is e ,  becomes both unsurveyable and im p ra c t ic a l .
The loss o f  molar fea tu res  through precise  exp lanat ion  means th e re  is a 
loss o f  seeing the world as a s i g n i f i c a n t  whole.  Nothing stands out in 
the p o s s i b i l i t y  space o f  subatomic p a r t i c l e s  save the behavior o f  those 
p a r t i c l e s .  The s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  an e ven t ,  on the o th e r  hand, is embedded 
in the background o f  a whole,  seen at  a molar s ca le ;  only then can an 
event  stand ou t .  For Heidegger tha t  whole is the r e la t i o n a l  t o t a l i t y  
o f  involvements,  i . e . ,  the wor ld .  To a r t i c u l a t e  the s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  an
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event  by showing how i t  stands out in the world is to exp la in  i t  
d e l c t i c a l l y . ^  But d e i c t i c  exp lana t ion  is , contrary  to Heidegger's  
t h e s i s ,  a t  lea s t  compatible w i th  s c i e n t i f i x  exp la n a t io n .
Science,  as t h e o r i a ,  gives us a view o f  the world which is law­
f u l .  W i th in  th e  nexus o f  laws any event may be e xp la ined .  By d e t e r ­
mining the i n i t i a l  condit ions and applying the re le v a n t  laws, an event  
may be p re d ic te d ;  given the event and the laws, we may r e t r o d i c t  the 
i n i t i a l  cond i t ions .  What is n o t e n t a i l e d  w i th in  the nomological e x ­
p lana t ion  is e i t h e r  the request f o r  the exp lanat ion  or  the re levancy o f
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a p a r t i c u l a r  e x p la n a t io n .  A s c i e n t i f i c  exp lanat ion  i l lu m in a te s  an 
event in the nexus o f  laws. But even when the event to be exp la ined  has 
been i d e n t i f i e d  somehow, many nomological chains may be traced through a 
concrete molar e ven t .  The exp lanat ion  i t s e l f  is not s u f f i c i e n t  grounds 
f o r  deciding  i f  re lev an t  laws are brought to bear on the exp lanat ion  that  
relevancy must come from a concern which moves one to request an ex ­
p la n a t io n ,  and i t  is tha t  concern which becomes the grounds f o r  deciding  
i f  any p a r t i c u l a r  exp lanat ion  is r e le v a n t .  The a r t i c u l a t i o n  o f  a con­
cern is given in d e i c t i c  e x p la n a t io n :  our response to the s ig n i f ic a n c e
o f  an event  may i n c i t e  us to request a s c i e n t i f i c - e x p l a n a t i o n  .
Given th is  view o f  science and s c i e n t i f i c  exp lanat ion  and drawing
on Bunge's work,  we can see p r e c is e ly  the r e l a t i o n  between science and 
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technology.  Bunge d is t ingu ishes  between a s c i e n t i f i c  law and a techno­
lo g ic a l  r u le .  S c i e n t i f i c  laws describe  a pred ic ted  event in the way we 
have seen above. The circumstances set the i n i t i a l  condit ions fo r  
re lev an t  laws. Technological  r u le s ,  on the o ther  hand, use s c i e n t i f i c  
laws as p re s c r ip t io n s  f o r  ob ta in in g  desired r e s u l t s .  I f  we wish to
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procure a consequent,  the technologica l  ru le  prescr ibes  our securing the 
antecedent condit ions f o r  th a t  consequent. Bunge's general fo rmula t ion  
f o r  technologica l  r u le s ,  then ,  is where A implies  B, i f  we wish re s u l t  
B, then do A. Thus, i f  we want to r id  ourselves o f  the conjest ion  o f  a 
head co ld ,  we take a dosage o f  phenoproponolomine because we know th a t  
drug has a n t i -h y s tem ic  p ro p e r t ie s .  The c ru c ia l  c o n t r ib u t io n  o f  science  
to technology is the t h e o r e t i c a l  grounding science gives to techniques.  
S c i e n t i f i c  laws a r t i c u l a t e  a ground fo r  a c t ion  by showing the r e la t io n
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between antecedent and consequent c ond i t ions .
For Heidegger h i g h l ig h t in g  the r e la t io n s h ip  between antecedent  
and consequent cond i t ions  means order ing  the real  through the framework 
o f  technology. This order in g  e n t a i l s  what Bunge c a l l s  technologica l  
fo re c a s t .  Knowing th a t  the real is ordered by the general  formula i f  A 
then B, then one may secure B by securing A. Technological  fo re c as t in g  
means manipula t ing present circumstances in order  to obta in  a fu tu re  
goal .  This is done o f  course by securing and chal lenging the r e a l ,  
manipulat ing i t  such t h a t  i t  a l igns  i t s e l f  w i th  the antecedent condi t ions  
p r e c i p i t a t i n g  the desired consequent.
But here we must stop and r e i t e r a t e  th a t  s c i e n t i f i c  laws do not 
e n t a i l  a technologica l  fo r e c a s t .  As I pointed out above, s c i e n t i f i c  
laws do not e n t a i l ,  demand, or requ ire  the secur ing o f  antecedent con­
d i t i o n s ;  they only  e x p la in  the r e la t io n  between antecedent and conse­
quent cond i t ions .  Technological  ru les can only  a r is e  a t  the leve l  o f  
being d i re c te d  by a p r i o r  con ce rn - - in  the case o f  technologica l  rules  
and f o re c a s ts ,  to secure a desired r e s u l t .  Mitcham places emphasis on 
technology as v o l i t i o n  fo r  p r e c is e ly  t h i s  reason; i f  s c i e n t i f i c  laws
are to be used as technologica l  ru le s ,  then the impetus f o r  t h e i r  a p p l i ­
cat ion  must come from a desire  to obta in  a c e r t a in  end. Heidegger is 
ambiguous on t h i s  p o in t :  both humans and being p a r t i c i p a t e  in the
guidance o f  o rde r in g  by the framework o f  technology.  Even though humans 
have freedom in regards to technology,  Heidegger stresses the o v er ­
whelming in f luence  being has on how we take up w i th  the r e a l .  What is
c le a r  is th a t  ta k in g  up w i th  the real  as a resource by attempting to
secure antecedent condi t ions  is l )  not a matter  o f  d iscovering  s c i e n t i f i c
laws, and 2) not e n t a i l e d  in the laws.
Thus we can make a p r in c ip le d  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  as Bunge does,  between
s c i e n t i f i c  laws and exp lanat ion  and technologica l  ru les and f o r e c a s t ,  o r
as Agassi does between the need fo r  corroborat ion  in technological
invention and the need f o r  r e f u t a t i o n  and conjecture  in s c i e n t i f i c  
75progress.  S c i e n t i f i c  exp lana t ion  places an event w i th in  a lawful  
nexus, but only  a t  the request f o r  an e x p la n a t io n .  Such a request must 
come from a concern a r t i c u l a t e d  in what we have c a l le d  d e i c t i c  e x p la ­
n a t io n ,  except a t  the leading edge o f  physics where problems in need of  
exp lana t ion  pose themselves.  The progress o f  science here is measured 
by the power o f  a new hypothesis to exp la in  " th e  re fu ted  [ i . e . ,  former]  
hypothesis ,  as a specia l  case and as a f i r s t  approximation,  plus the new 
[ i . e .  , h i t h e r t o  unexplained] f a c t . " ^  The framework o f  technology  
c a r r ie s  out i t s  o rder ing  o f  the real  by secur ing antecedent condi t ions  
on the  basis o f  technologica l  ru les .  Here the use o f  s c i e n t i f i c  laws 
is guided by the concern fo r  o b ta in ing  a desired r e s u l t  and securing  
t h a t  r e s u l t  by securing i t s  antecedent c ond i t ions .
He idegger 's  view o f  science as d e r iv a t i v e  is complicated by the
fa c t  th a t  i t  may be construed in three ways: 1) science is o b je c t iv e
and d is in t e r e s t e d ;  2) science is a matter  o f  assuming a c e r t a in  a t t i t u d e  
and 3) science d i s t o r t s  f u l l - b o d i e d  r e a l i t y .  Science is o b j e c t i v e ,  and 
as we have seen, d i s in t e r e s t e d  in regards to what i t  analyzes.  But th is  
i t  turns o u t ,  is r e a l l y  no c r i t i c i s m  b u t ,  r a t h e r ,  a re a f f i r m in g  o f  the 
f a c t  th a t  science needs e x te rna l  guidance in regards to the c a l l  fo r  
an e x p la n a t io n .  Presumably we have c a l le d  fo r  a s c i e n t i f i c  e x p la n a t io n ,  
and the prec is ion  o f  such an exp lana t ion  sharpens the focus on a leve l  
o f  the world h i t h e r t o  unnoticed.  Chemistry t e l l s  me how and why the  
cof fe e  b o i led  over in a way th a t  is not immediately apparent .  Thus I 
have learned something about my world which I would otherwise  not have 
known. Heidegger would argue tha t  so to gain in s ig h t  is merely being  
d iv e r t e d  and fasc inated  by the world and not r e a l l y  being involved c i r -  
cumspect ive ly .  (This  p o i n t ,  however, is ambiguous and w i l l  be d e a l t  
w ith  l a t e r . )  I only wish to po in t  up here th a t  I am not merely s ta r in g  
a t  the equipment w i t h in  my purview by seeking such an e x p la n a t io n ,  nor 
am I d i v e r t i n g  my a t t e n t i o n  away from my concern; I seek an exp 1 anat ion 
on the basis o f  a concern, and in the process come to r e a l i z e  how the 
world works.  The simple f a c t  th a t  there  is a loss o f  molar fea tures  
does not mean there ,  is  a break w i th  the concern which moved me to c a l l  
f o r  such an exp lana t ion  in the f i r s t  p lace .  Granted,  we u su a l ly  do not  
c a l l  f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  exp lana t ion  j u s t  to learn  about the w o r ld ,  but I 
b e l ie v e  th is  only emphasizes our technological  p ropens ity - -we  expect  
re s u l ts  to come out o f  our undertaking a s c i e n t i f i c  e x p la n a t io n .
Don Ihde points  out t h a t  Heidegger loses th is  f i r s t  sense of  
science as d e r iv a t  i ve as he develops h is  mature t h o u g h t ; ^  The mistake
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Heidegger makes is assuming science to be an a t t i t u d e  which reduces 
f u l l - b o d i e d  r e a l i t y .  As mentioned above, we may i n t e r p r e t  " r e v e a l in g "  
in Being and Time in a strong or weak sense. Science,  as a th e o r e t i c a l  
a t t i t u d e ,  tends toward the s t rong ,  but f a l s e ,  sense o f  d is c lo s u re .  The 
im p l ic a t io n  is  th a t  we would see r e a l i t y  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  i . e . ,  in i t s  f u l l  
r ichness ,  i f  we were not seeing i t  through the t h e o r e t ic a l  a t t i t u d e ,  tha t  
science sees a d i f f e r e n t  r e a l i t y  than circumspective concern.  C le a r ly  
t h i s  is not the case,  f o r  sc ience,  though o b j e c t i v e ,  does not c o n s t i tu te  
or frame r e a l i t y  but describes i t  in i t s  lawfu l  workings.  But as 
Heidegger's  thought evolves and the o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  science drops o u t ,  
the t h e o r e t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  is l e f t  ambiguous as to whether the a t t i t u d e  
frames a c e r t a in  kind o f  d is c lo s u re .  In h is  mature works science is 
the c h i ld  and the hera ld  o f  technology.  The ambiguity remains in the  
problem o f  human freedom and the ex ten t  to which technology frames the  
d isc losure  o f  r e a l i t y .
I t  is the t h i r d  sense o f  science as d e r iv a t i v e  which is most 
c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d  as technology: science reduces and d i s t o r t s  f u l l ^
bodied r e a l i t y .  In the mature works Heidegger po ints  out tha t  the  
order in g  o f  the real  by the framework suppresses any concern fo r  s i g n i ­
f ic a n c e ;  the real  is chal lenged and taken up wi th  in only one way— as 
resource.  The s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  things is leve led  and subdued because our  
involvement w i th  them is on ly  f o r  obta in ing  a desired r e s u l t .  Science,  
as a reduction o f  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  is strengthened as technology because 
technology not on ly  reduces and leve ls  s ig n i f ic a n c e  but transforms the  
r e a l ,  as resource,  in to  a new kind o f  r e a l i t y ,  v i z .  commodity. . But the  
work o f  Bunge and Agassi c l e a r l y  aims a t  the kind o f  confounding
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Heidegger does here .  Science,  they show, is necessary to the o rd e r in g  
by the framework,  but not s u f f i c i e n t .
I t  is technology which is  d e r iv a t i v e  in tha t  i t  deals w i th  the 
real  only  as resource.  The real  is p re s e n t -a t -h a n d ,  t °  be secured.
The r e f e r e n t i a l  context  o f  the ready-to-hand is broken and reduced 
to 'be ing on c a l l ' ;  because our involvement is now only  to secure 
antecedent c o n d i t io n s ,  we turn away from the r ich  references and 
assignments in the world and merely "stand beside" e n t i t i e s .
This i s  an important p o i n t ,  f o r  most phi losophers o f  phenome­
nolog ica l  o r i e n t a t i o n  assume Heidegger is c o r re c t  in his assessment 
o f  science.  Science is the d e r iv a t i v e  way modern man takes up w i th  
the r e a l .  But in fa c t  they beat a straw man. Recognizing th a t  s c i ­
ence is a necessary in g re d ie n t  f o r  modern technology,  i t  is perhaps 
the  most t a n g i b l e ,  and thus most c e r t a i n ,  aspect o f  technology.  So 
i t  is no wonder they a t ta c k  science in vent ing t h e i r  f r u s t r a t i o n s  
about a very co-opting  adversary .  But t h i s  move o f  t h e i rs  is i t s e l f  
a te chnolog ica l  s o l u t i o n ,  and a mistaken one at  t h a t ,  f o r  i t  t r i e s  
to secure a s o lu t io n  (the re format ion o f  technology) .  The move is 
misleading in th a t  science gives us a ( l a w f u l )  view o f  the w o r ld ,  
and i t  is  not c le a r  why we should abandon such a view (save i t s  
r e la t i o n  w i th  technology) .  By acknowledging tha t  1) science needs 
d i r e c t i o n  and guidance from d e i c t i c  .e x p la n a t io n , and th a t  2) we can 
d is t in g u is h  s c i e n t i f i c  laws from technologica l  r u le s ,  we need not  
abandon the s c i e n t i f i c  world view. The c ru c ia l  question is how in 
f a c t  we use s c i e n t i f i c  laws. Much e f f o r t  is wasted in t r y in g  to
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dismiss the cogency o f  science (a cogency which has overwhelming e v i ­
dence in i t s  support)  when the real  problem i s ,  though more e l u s i v e ,  
less d i f f i c u l t  to cha l lenge .
4.  The Problem o f  Technology in Being and Time 
and the Reform o f  Technology in the Late r  Heidegger
The chal lenge to technology proves to be less d i f f i c u l t  because 
the issue does not turn on cogency, ra ther  on how one should involve  
one's s e l f w i t h  t h e w o r l d .  I m p l i c i t l y  Being and Time suggests how we 
might counter the  p r iv a t io n  o f  technology by a t tend ing  to th ings .
S ig n i f ic a n c e  draws together a r e f e r e n t i a l  context .  Equipment points  to
th a t  context  and, thus,  to s ig n i f i c a n c e .  Consider,  again ,  my spoke 
wrench. As a piece o f  equipment i t  f i t s  the need o f  t ru in g  a wheel as
w el l  as p o in t ing  to when i t s  use is needed, i . e . ,  when I r ide  and no t ice
an i r r i t a t i n g  wobble in the b ik e .  In the background, then,  stands the 
bike and my r id in g  i t .  But more is circumscribed than simply r id in g  my 
b ic y c l e .  There are the reasons fo r  my r i d i n g .  Some, to be s ure ,  are  
u t i l i t a r i a n :  t h i s  is how I to te  my grocer ies home, get to work,  and do
errands .  But i t  is in r id in g  my bike  tha t  I a lso not ice  the change in
seasons, the grade of  a road,  the c h i l l  and force o f  the wind; I fee l  the
e x h i l i r a t i o n  o f  moving down the road on my own power. In short  I p a r ­
t i c i p a t e  and involve  myself in the wor ld .  The world is disclosed in ways
which are made access ib le  when 1 r id e .  A p a r t i c u l a r  h i l l  announces 
i t s e l f  when my pedal ra te  decreases and pedal resis tance increases.  The 
wind shows i t s  force when i t  slows me down o r  helps me along.  Though 
these s ignf icances  may be " f e l t "  in other  ways, my involvement w i th  
them is focused and made possible  through b i c y c l in g .  The spoke wrench 
is a lso re fe r re d  to in th is  c on tex t ,  though not e x p l i c i t l y .  The
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reference becomes e x p l i c i t  when I notice  the v ib r a t io n  o f  a wheel is not 
only  annoying but requires more e f f o r t  to overcome, d e t r a c t in g  from my 
enjoy ing the morning a i r  and l i g h t  as I r o l l  along. Such a v ib r a t io n  
c a l l s  f o r  my involvement in the form o f  t ru in g  the wheel .  Indeed, there  
is  an unbroken context  o f  engagement: the involvement o f  my r ide
re fe rs  to the care and maintenance o f  my b ic y c le ;  the nagging wobble 
o f  the wheel s ignals  a need to true  the wheel so that  I may maximize my 
e f f o r t s  when 1 meet the chal lenge of  the h i l l  o r  the wind.  Such in v o lv e ­
ment contrasts  w i th  the involvement I have wi th  technologica l  devices.  
Adjusting a t e le v i s io n  set  is needed when the co lor  or  t i n t  does not  
t r u l y  represent f lesh  tones or the p ic tu re  is out o f  tune.  The e x p l i c i t  
re fe rence to adjustment comes in the context o f  my s i t t i n g ,  watching the 
screen, and the involvement amounts to my g e t t in g  up from the c h a i r  and 
tu rn ing  the appropr ia te  d i a l s .  There is no s k i l l  as is the case in 
t r u in g  a wheel .  Limited involvement,  and a deprived s e t t i n g  f o r  the 
involvement,  there  is .
The r e la t io n  o f  my morning r ide  to work and the spoke wrench may 
be a r t i c u l a t e d  when we recognize how the wrench re la te s  to the b ic yc le  
and how the b ic yc le  provides access to what stands out in the wor ld .
Such an exp lana t ion  would be o f  the d e i c t i c  k in d .  When someone asks me 
why I r id e ,  I give  j u s t  such a kind o f  e xp la n a t io n :  there is a t h r i l l
a t  being able  to move through the a i r  under my own power, an e x h i l e r -  
a t io n  a t  being a l i v e ;  the smooth r ide  d e l iv e red  by a w e l l - tu n e d  b ike;  
the grade o f  a h i l l ,  the w e a th er - - th e se  are a l l  p a r t  o f  th a t  exper ience .  
So the meaning o f  th a t  spoke wrench c a r r ie s  not only the reference to 
trued wheels but a lso the exper ience o f  invo lv ing  o n e s e l f  w i th  the
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world by r id in g .
Heidegger shows us much more r i c h l y  how s ig n i f ic a n c e  is gathered  
when he exp la ins  d e i c t i c a l l y  how things focus a world along the four  
dimensions o f  e a r t h ,  sky,  m o r ta ls ,  and d i v i n i t i e s .  His examples are o f  
a jug and a b r id g e .  The br idge  spans w a t e r ,  drawing together  two banks 
o f  e a r t h ,  so th a t  mortals may move to and f r o  across the w ater .  This 
water  is fed by the sky and a covering is made to give  s h e l t e r  to mor­
ta l s  against  the r a in .  Mortals move from one bank to the o ther  carry ing  
out  the d a i l y  task o f  a t tend ing  the f i e l d s .  The day- to -day  tasks are 
done in the shadow o f  knowing tha t  mortals are more than the clods o f  
e a r th  they plow, but one is a lso  reminded that  l i f e  is not wholly  secure 
and there should be thanksgiv ing f o r  what one has. Thus the d i v i n i t i e s  
are  drawn in also by the presence o f  a s ta tue  o f  a patron s a in t  which 
reminds the mortals o f  that  thanksgiv ing.
The fo u r f o ld  comes to a focus in things and is a r t i c u l a t e d  in the  
kind o f  exp lana t ion  which draws together  the background. In such focal  
things humans f in d  t h e i r  p lace .  Mirrored in the gather ing  is the world  
in which humans p a r t i c i p a t e .  We recognize our m o r t a l i t y  when comparing 
i t  to the s i l e n t  ear th  and the d i v i n i t y  o f  the godhead. The importance 
o f  focal  things comes forward when we recognize th a t  such things remind 
us o f  our m o r t a l i t y  by r e f l e c t i n g  our r e la t io n s h ip  w i th  the o ther  d i ­
mensions. To be m o r ta l ,  in one ins tance ,  is to l i v e  on e a r t h ,  to gather  
the grapes sustained by the s o i l  and nurtured by the ra in s ;  the wine made, 
is  poured in l i b a t i o n  and thanksgiv ing .  I t  is in focal  things th a t  one 
may see r e f l e c t e d  one's place in the wor ld .  Such r e f l e c t i o n ,  i f  i t  is 
to o r i e n t  us, must be a r t i c u l a t e d ,  and th is  a r t i c u l a t i o n  comes in
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d e i c t i c  e xp la n a t io n .
The real  opposi t ion is not between science and th ings ,  but  
ra th e r  between focal  things and technology.  Technology lev e ls  down 
s ig n i f i c a n c e  by not a l lowing anything to stand o u t .  Everyth ing is seen 
only as resource,  and one resource is  as good as another so long as i t  
secures the desired ends. By l e v e l l i n g  s ig n i f ic a n c e  we cannot o r i e n t  
ourselves w i th in  the world the way we can w i th  focal  th ings :  there  is
nothing to r e f l e c t  our place in the world because no place e x i s t s .  
Heidegger i m p l i c i t l y  suggests we may counter technology by tu rn ing  to  
foca l  things and involv ing  ourselves w i th  them. The suggestion is based 
on tak ing  involvement w i th  the ready-to-hand as the pr imordia l  way o f  
b e i n g - i n - t h e - w o r 1d . Without such involvement the f o u r f o ld  col lapses  
and we no longer see ourselves in the m ir ro r  p lay .
But how does t h i s  suggestion get c a r r ie d  out? How and where may 
we act  w i th in  the framework o f  technology? To answer these questions we 
must take a c loser  look a t  how technology es tab l is h es  i t s e l f .  More 
bro a d ly ,  we are in q u i r in g  in to  the socia l  s e t t in g  f o r  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
(freedom) o f  technology as i t  is  sketched in Being and Time. Here 
Dasein should turn from the in a u th e n t ic  to the a u th e n t ic  s e l f .  As we 
s h a l l  see t h i s  move encompasses both human r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and a socia l  
s e t t i n g ,  though in Being and Time i t  remains ambiguous. The ambiguity  
d isso lves  when we see the stand Heidegger makes in h is  l a t e r  works. By 
looking a t  the l a t e r  works through Being and Time the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  
f o r  technology,  as wel l  as i t s  socia l  s e t t i n g ,  becomes c le a r .
5.  The Social  S e t t in g  o f  Technology in Being and Time
The e x i s t e n t i a l  ana lys is  o f  Dasein shows that  Dasein i s ,  f i  rs t  
and foremost,  in a u th e n t ic .  That is  to say Dasein f i r s t  becomes aware 
o f  i t s e l f  and appropr iates  the world in terms th a t  i t  accepts from 
o th e rs .  Dasein discovers i t s e l f  in the world w i th  others  and encounters  
them in the environment as those f o r  whom work is  done. Hence work im­
p l i c i t l y  c a r r ie s  w i th  i t  the reference to o th e rs .  The concern in r e ­
gards to th is  r e f e r e n t i a l  s t r u c tu r e  Heidegger c a l l s  s o l i c i t u d e .  Dasein 
knows i t s e l f  against the background o f  the world and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in 
contrast  to o thers :
This be ing -w i th -one -another  d isso lves  one's own Dasei n 
completely  in to  the kind o f  being o f  ' the  O t h e r s ' ,  in 
such a way, indeed, tha t  the Others,  as d is t in g u is h a b le  
and e x p l i c i t ,  vanish more and more. In th is  inconspicu­
ousness and u n a s c e r ta in a b i1 i t y , the real  d i c t a t o r s h ip  o f  
the "they" is unfo lded. We take pleasure and enjoy ou r ­
selves  as they take p leasure ;  we read,  see,  and judge 
about l i t e r a t u r e  and a r t  as they see and judge; l ikew ise  
we shr ink  back from the 'g re a t  mass' as they shr ink  back; 
we f in d  shocking what they f ind  shocking.  The " t h e y , "  
which is nothing d e f i n i t e ,  and which a l l  a r e ,  though not  
as sum, prescr ibes  the kind o f  being o f  e v e r y d a y n e s s .78
But the " d i c t a t o r s h ip "  o f  the " they"  is not w i thout  i t s  conso­
l a t i o n s .  Dasein chooses to abdicate  i t s  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  a de c is io n ,  
and thus the freedom to p a r t i c i p a t e  a u t h e n t i c a l l y  in the w or ld .  The 
" they"  does not d i c t a t e  w i thout  Dasein's consent.  In exchange f o r  i t s  
abd ica t ion  Dasein is accommodated.
They "they" is there  alongside everywhere,  but in 
such a manner tha t  i t  has always s to len  away whenever 
Dasein presses fo r  a dec is ion .  Yet because the "they"  
presents every judgment and decis ion as i t s  own, i t
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depr ives the p a r t i c u l a r  Dasein o f  i t s  a n s w e r a b i l i t y .
. . .  I t  can be answerable fo r  every th ing  most e a s i l y ,  
because i t  is  not someone who needs to vouch f o r  any­
th in g .  I t  ‘was1 always the "they" who did i t ,  and yet  
i t  can be said  tha t  i t  has been 'no o n e ' .  . . .
Thus the p a r t i c u l a r  Dasein in i t s  everydayness 
is disburdened by the " t h e y . "  Not only t h a t ;  by thus 
disburdening i t  o f  i t s  Being, the " they"  accommodates 
Dasein i f  Dasein has any tendency to take things e a s i l y  
and make them easy.  And because the " they"  constant ly  
accommodates the p a r t i c u l a r  Dasein by disburdening i t  
o f  i t s  Being,  the " they"  re ta ins  and enhances i t s  s tub­
born dominion.79
We see tha t  the world o f  the " they"  is tempting f o r  Dasein because i t  
disburdens Dasein o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  and provides Dasein wi th an a r t i c u ­
l a t i o n  o f  s ig n i f i c a n c e :  "When e n t i t i e s  are encountered,  Dasein's world
frees  them f o r  a t o t a l i t y  o f  involvements w i th  which the " they"  is 
f a m i l i a r  and w i th in  the l im i t s  which have been e s tab l ish ed  w i th  the 
" t h e y 's "  averageness.  What tempts Dasein to opt f o r  the world o f  the 
" they"  is  the re lease  from the u n c e r ta in ty  o f  seeking and appropr ia t ing  
in an a u th e n t ic  way one's own involvement in the wor ld .
Through the  s e l f - c e r t a i n t y  and decidedness o f  the " t h e y , "  
i t  gets spread abroad in c rea s in g ly  tha t  there  is no need 
of  a u th e n t ic  understanding or  the s t a t e  o f  mind th a t  goes 
w ith  i t .  The supposit ion  o f  the " they"  th a t  one is 
leading and su s ta in in g  a f u l l  and genuine ' l i f e ' ,  br ings  
Dasein a t r a n q u i l i t y ,  f o r  which every th ing  is ' i n  the  
best o f  o rd e r '  and a l l  doors are o p e n . ^ O
But how, i f  the " they"  es tab l is hes  a world and places Dasein in 
i t ,  can the " they"  hold a " d ic t a t o r s h ip "  over or ra th e r  e n t i c e  Dasein? 
What does i t  mean fo r  Dasein to give up i t s  own being in the world?
For answers we shal l  undertake a c lo ser  examination o f  the s t r u c tu r e  o f  
the world o f  the "they" and how i t  a n t i c ip a t e s  the framework of  
technology.
When Dasein measures i t s e l f  against the standards the " they"
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art iculates  and establishes, Dase?n is concerned with the distance
between i t s e l f  and others. This distance is closed by "leveling down"
any d i f f i c u l t i e s  or differences Dasein may encounter. The "they"
accommodates Dasein by its concern with averageness.^
In this averageness with which [the "they"] prescribes 
what can and may be ventured, i t  keeps watch over every­
thing exceptional that thrusts i t s e l f  to the fore.
Every kind of p r io r i ty  gets noiselessly suppressed.
Overnight everything that is primordial gets glossed 
over as something that has long been well known. Every 
thing gained by a struggle becomes just  something to 
be manipulated.82
The glossing over and covering up allows everyone to have access to what 
is now fam i l ia r  and commonplace, a fa m i l ia r i ty  which gives the appearance 
of being an intimate part of the world. D i f f ic u l t ie s  are brought close, 
not by "making them one's own," but rather by removing the referentia l  
context.
The "they," as i t  is in the world through averageness, shows
i t s e l f  in publicness. "In u t i l i z i n g  public means of transport and in
making use of information services such as the newspaper, every Other is 
83l ike  the next."  In the public world, " . . .  a covered railway p la t ­
form takes account of bad weather; an insta l la t ion for public l ight ing  
takes account of the darkness, or rather of specif ic  changes in the
84presence or absence of daylight-- the 'position of the sun. '"  A radio
conquers remoteness by expanding the everyday environment such that i t
85encompasses far  away places, bringing them close.
These examples of Heidegger's show the pattern of levell ing down 
through accessibi l i ty  and manipulation. A covered railway platform 
accommodates Dasein by manipulating the access to the world so that  
Dasein does not have to be bothered by rain or snow, or so that Dasein
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may always see. The texture of changing nature as i t  is f e l t  in a
change of sky or the seasons is levelled down to the uniformity of dry
pavement or adequate i l luminat ion.  In order to reach out and draw
closer remote parts of the world, as i t  is accomplished by news wire
services, radio (and for us, s a t e l l i t e  te lev is ion ) ,  public accessibi l i ty
to information is presented as a "common, everyday occurrence"; and,
in fa c t ,  i t  is just  that .  The background and context o f ,  say, a people's
struggle with its  government, is drawn into everyday public view. But
the public view manipulates that struggle by removing i t  from its  l ived
context and showing as an everyday occurrence. I t  is just  that: the
struggle appears in our everyday environment, not as a struggle of which
we are a p a r t ,  but as an occurrence.
When "every Other is l ike  the next," the "they" becomes faceless.
This leve l l ing  of other Dasein is best seen as the "public" in public
opinion. Daniel J. Boorstin, in Democracy and its  Discontents, ver i f ies
Heidegger's notion of the "they" when he recognizes the rise in power
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and prestige of public opinion. Whereas opinion was at one time con­
trasted with knowledge and considered a substandard authority teetering  
on the brink of e rror ,  and with the rise of representational forms of  
government and the need to respond to those represented, the gathering of
various individual preferences coalesced into "a much more potent single
87col lect ive  judgment." When opinions congealed, opinion went under the 
heading "Public" and seemed much more respectable than any individual  
judgment.
Of course, for a democratic society l ike  ours, " i t  is important, 
we are to ld ,  that our c i t izenry  be "well informed." Our newspapers,
kk
our radio programs, and our television are a ll  crucial to our in s t i -
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tutions because they keep citizens "well informed.1 Information,
however, is data, bits and pieces of "knowledge" without the cohesive
and overarching structure which makes connections between those bits and
pieces. Consequently, news--the dissemination of information for the
purpose of keeping ourselves well informed--comes disjointed, each piece
without connection to the next. And in the process of f i l l i n g  each
vacuum with information, we overcommunicate:
Not so long ago, a person had to make a special e f fo r t  
to get a message in from the world around him. For 
news he had to purchase a newspaper. For other in for ­
mation, he had to buy a book or attend a lecture, which 
was expensive, or find a traveler  who might be scarce, 
or go to a theater, which performed only occasionally.
Nowadays communication is an everywhere a l l - t h e -  
time thing. To escape messages we have to make a 
special e f f o r t —and we seldom succeed. Even when we 
come into our own liv ing room we cannot avoid a glimpse 
of some f a r - o f f  stage on the television screen being 
watched by someone else in the f a m i l y . 9̂
The ubiquity of information indicates a centralized system of 
dissemination. Boorstin cites advertising as the embodiment of this 
central i  zat ion.
As expansion and novelty have become essential to 
our economy, advertising has played an ever larger role:  
in the se t t l ing  of  the continent, in the expansion of 
the economy, and in the building of an American standard 
of l iv ing.  Advertising has expressed the optimism, the 
hyperbole, and the sense of community, the sense of 
reaching which has been so important a feature of our 
ci v i 1izat ion.90
I f  we consider democracy not just  as a p o l i t ica l  
system but as a set of inst i tut ions which do aim to 
make everything avai lable to everybody i t  would not be 
an overstatement to describe advertising as the character­
is t ic  rhetoric of democracy.91
Advertising perpetuates and keeps alive our cultural t ies ,  that sense of
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optimism, of who we are and where we are going.
But there is an a l l  too obvious s h i f t  here:  p e c u l i a r  expressions
o f  who we are no longer " . . .  sprout from the e a r t h ,  from the v i l l a g e ,
from the farm, or  even the neighborhood or  the c i t y .  . . . They come
qo
from . . . networks of newspapers, radio, te levis ion. . . The
culture is no longer rooted in things close by, but rather in vague 
appeal to a heritage expressed in economic expansion and played out in 
the la test commodity designed to ease the burden of l iv ing .  Advertising 
gives us this amorphous culture by showing us, everywhere, how the cu l­
ture is to be l ived out. I f  we work hard in the mountains, surely we 
would not drink a f la t land beer; i f  we were smart we would not be caught 
dead with an ordinary oven; i f  we want the elegant look for our home, 
our flooring should take us there.
Our kind of culture is here today and gone tomorrow--or 
the day a f te r  tomorrow. Or whenever the next semi-annual 
model appears. And insofar as folk culture becomes 
advertising and advertising becomes central ized, i t  
becomes a way of  depriving people of  the ir  opportunities 
for individual and smal1-community expression. Our 
technology and our economy and our democratic ideals 
have a l l  helped make that possible.93
Now that we have obtained from Heidegger an outline of everyday 
existence, i . e . ,  of the "they," and from Boorstin independent i l l u s ­
trat ion and confirmation of this sort of existence, we turn to Heidegger's 
more detailed analysis of the "they." Boorstin shows us the influence 
of public opinion as i t  is exercised in advertising: i t  expresses the
vision of what the public considers good (or bad) and the way the public 
discusses i t .  For Heidegger, these features of the "they" re f lect  a 
formal structure of Dasein's everyday existence. Fal 1ing, as the t i t l e
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heading the structure of idle ta lk ,  curiosity and ambiguity, elaborates
formally the averageness of the "they." idle t a lk ,  as the discourse of
the "they," is concerned not with Dasein's primordial relationship with
significance, but rather with simply what is said. "What is sa id - in -
the - ta lk  gets understood; but what the ta lk  is about is understood only
proximally and s u p e r f i c ia l l y . " ^
The primary relationship-of-Belng towards the ent i ty  
talked about is not 'imparted' by communication; but 
Being-with-one-another takes place in talk ing with 
one another and in concern with what is said in the
ta lk .  . . . And because this discoursing has lost its
primary relatlonship-of-Being towards the ent i ty  
talked about, or else has never achieved such a 
relationship, i t  does not communicate in such a way 
as to le t  this en t i ty  be appropriated in a primordial 
manner, but communicates rather by following the 
route of goss i ping and pass i ng the word along■ What
is s a id - in - th e - ta lk  as such spreads in wider circles
and takes on an authori tat ive character.95
By accenting the expression of significance as opposed to involve­
ment with i t ,  Dasein subtly withdraws i t s e l f  from the more fundamental 
ground of original  disclosure. The d i f f i c u l t y ,  the context, the involved
history of a disclosive or focal event, gets passed over and is taken as
something that can be understood by everyone. This transpires because 
of the s h i f t  from the event and its  context to simply "talking about 
i t . "  Idle ta lk  is groundless in that i t  is removed from the primordial 
relationship of being involved in the world. Because the disclosure of 
significance is perverted into an understanding of what is said, and not
an understanding of the context of that significance, idle ta lk  closes
96o f f  any need to return to the ground of involvement. Since Dasein is 
uninvolved in idle ta lk  i t  " f loats"  unattached, being alongside the world 
in a pr ivat ive manner. Without attachment, without a founding involvement
b7
Dasein may move from one subject to the next unencumbered so as to pass 
i t s e l f  o f f  as genuinely understanding an event of significance.
Curiosity, as the sight of the "they" exemplifies this unattach­
ment even more. Curiosity " . . .  is not confined to seeing, but ex­
presses the tendency towards a preculiar way of le t t ing  the world be 
encountered by us in p e r c e p t i o n ."97 That peculiar way, of course, is 
depriving our purview of  the world of  any circumspective concern.
Dasein is concerned only with the world in the possible ways i t  looks. 
"Seeing poss ib i l i t ies  in the world" arises from the truncation of any 
circumspective involvement.
In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care 
does not l ie  in grasping something and being knowingly 
in truth;  i t  l ies  rather in its  poss ib i l i t ies  of aban­
doning i t s e l f  to the world. . . . Consequently i t  does 
not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather 
seeks restlessness and the excitement of continual 
novelty and changing encounters. In not tarrying,  
curiosity  is concerned with the constant possib i l i ty  
of d i stract  ion.9^
Dasein moves from one possib i l i ty  to the next, since there is no
concern which lays claim to i t .  Thus, "curiosity is everywhere and no- 
99where." There is no sustaining attention: Dasein is free to move from
novelty to novelty. But this remains privat ive since genuine, grounded 
involvement provides a place for Dasein (though the world of the "they" 
provides a ' l i f e '  for Dasein). The free movement passes i t s e l f  o f f  as 
opening a l l  doors.
This, then, leads to the third modification of f a l l i n g ,  that of 
ambi gui ty.
When, in our everyday Being-with-one-another, we 
encounter the sort of thing which is accessible to 
everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, i t
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soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed 
in genuine understanding, and what is n o t .100
The ambiguity stems from an exposure, through cur ios i ty ,  to everything 
and a lack of (authentic) understanding of anything since the primor­
dial ground of involvement is closed o f f  in idle ta lk .  With the d is ­
t inc t ive  character of things levelled down, the context provides no 
support for demarking what is genuine and what is not: everything be­
comes passed o f f  as genuine.
Dase i n " fa l ls "  into the world in the sense of being absorbed in 
the world characterized by idle t a lk ,  cur ios i ty ,  and ambiguity. "This 
'absorbtion in . . .  ' has mostly the character of being lost in the 
publicness of the 1 they1."10' Fall ing into the public world of the "they" 
means, ipso fac to , Dasein loses contact with the world of involvement. 
Dasein is tempted to f a l l  into the public world because of the s e l f -  
confident decisions the "they" ar t icu la tes:  the "they" provides a pre­
text for leading a fu l l  and genuine l i f e .  Dase i n acqu i res a t ran qu i l i ty  
in adopting this pretext,  disburdened not only of responsib il i ty , but 
also of struggle. At the same time, Dasein is alienated from the possi­
b i l i t y  of  authentic involvement in the world. Dasein plunges further  
and further into the groundless supposition that the 'they' " ossesses 
everything, or that everything is within its  reach."'02
For a l l  of the richness of Being and Time, Heidegger does not 
indicate how the disburdenment is executed. The "they" provides a pre­
text for l iv in g ,  and Heidegger suggests that through part ic ipation in 
the public world, the reading of newspapers for example, one gains 
access to that pretext .  But Heidegger does not show in Being and Time
how such partic ipation closes o f f  involvement. To be sure, genuine d is ­
closure is passed over when things are made easily avai lable;  the 
question is how are things made readily avai lable , or easy, in the 
public world. The "they" provides t ran qu i l i ty  by disburdening; but i t  
is not clear precisely how the disburdenment is carried out.
The level l ing  down and passing over of genuine disclosure is a 
f inding obtained from Heidegger's foundational approach. The world of 
the "they" is pr ivat ive  v is -a -v is  the unbroken richness of concernful 
circumspection. Heidegger abandons this foundational approach and moves 
on to discuss the framework of technology and focal things; this allows 
us to identify  the privation of the present-at-hand and the severing of  
involvement with the framework of technology. In this way the analysis 
o f  the framework shows how disburdenment is executed.
But we must recognize that Heidegger's analysis of the framework 
remains one-sided. For i t  does not account for the attractiveness of  
technology. Man accepts technology, indeed is partner with i t ,  yet 
Heidegger gives no e x p l ic i t  answer as to why humans accept what the 
framework has to o f fe r .  He describes the framework as i f  i t  were an ex­
tension of human imperialism: the a i r l in e r  stands on the runway "on
call  for duty," ensuring the poss ib i l i ty  of  transportation by being ready 
103for take-off .  But he believes technology is more than just  an instru­
ment by which humans procure what they desire; technology influences the 
way humans take up with re a l i ty .  The d i f f i c u l t y  here is that Heidegger 
wants to maintain that technology holds sway, but does not to ta l ly  
dominate man, nor does man to ta l ly  dominate technology. Consequently, 
Heidegger must s tr ike  a balance between technology's influence and the
attractiveness i t  has for man. The la t te r  is not dealt with in the 
analysis of the framework. The description of the a i r l in e r  suggests 
that the attractiveness of technology l ies in technology as the e f f e c t ­
ive means for  procuring power, but the suggestion is only tonal ,  and 
Heidegger makes no expansive remarks along this l ine .  He wants to main­
tain a certain amount of freedom between human beings and the framework. 
In order to do so Heidegger uses the term "holding sway" suggesting that  
the framework influences humans; but humans also go along with the frame­
work. Freedom can only be sustained i f  humans accept, in total responsi­
b i l i t y ,  what the framework has to o f fe r .  On the other hand, we must 
avoid thinking of technology as a mere instrument; such freedom in 
acceptance, then, must somehow be tempered. The subtle balance here is 
upset by Heidegger's forceful attempt to show the closing o f f  accom­
plished by the framework. Such language does not adequately answer, but 
does confuse, the issue of how the framework maintains its sway.
6. The Mutual I l lumination of Social 
Being and Technology
The key to the proper perspective l ies in the "they": the
attractiveness of technology l ies in our intoxication with disburden­
ment and distract ion.  The structure and analysis of the "they" elabor­
ates and complements the manipulation of the framework so that ,  seen 
through each other, the f lavor of technological l iv ing  becomes pers­
picuous. The confluence of the early and mature works answers the d i f f i ­
culties encountered in the respective works. The framework shows us how 
the "they" accomplishes its  goals; the analysis of the "they" sheds 
l igh t  on the question why we accept the singular revelation of technology.
F i rs t ,  the ordering of the framework is i t s e l f  a closing o f f .
Recall that the great danger of technology is that the ordering and 
securing of resources, as the only mode of disclosure, remains veiled 
and disguised. Within the framework the real is disclosed as resource. 
Reality is challenged, manipulated into the order; thus secured, the 
disclosive and focal power of a thing is constricted. What is drawn 
together within the framework is only the available resources. The 
world becomes wholly and essentially  technological.
Why then do we opt for the singular revelation of technology? 
Through securing of resources we are accommodated by technology since the 
framework, in its ordering, makes those resources available to us.
The coal that has been hauled out in some mining 
d i s t r ic t  has not been supp1ied in order that i t  may 
simply be present somewhere or other. I t  is
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stockpiled; that is ,  i t  is on call ready to deliver  
the sun's warmth that is stored. The sun's warmth is 
challenged forth for its  heat, which in turn is
ordered to deliver steam whose pressure turns the
wheels that keep a factory running.
Or, closer to home, the steam turbines at the coal- f i red generating plant,  
producing e le c t r i c i t y  to heat our homes and run our te levis ions, vacuum 
cleaners, and blenders. The access to these resources disburdens us by 
making use of such household items avai lable. I t  is not that each of  
these items taken individually  exemplifies the framework of technology; 
rather they bespeak a way of l i f e  and thus highl ight  the pattern ex­
hibited by that way of l i f e .  What is crucial is the extent which the
pattern of disburdenment becomes one of distraction and disengagement. ^ 5  
Consider the commonplace and everyday convenience of driving a 
car to run errands, or for that matter to v i s i t  friends or travel to new 
places. The car covers distances re la t ive ly  quickly in at least moderate 
comfort. One has only to s i t  behind a wheel in order to gain elevations 
of several thousand feet or travel several hundred miles; the pain of 
sore muscles and aching jo in ts  is nil save the discomfort of s i t t in g  for  
long periods of time. I f  we need only to travel cross town to purchase 
groceries, there generally is no discomfort. We are spared a hike of 
several miles with cumbersome sacks of groceries; the car makes getting 
groceries and seeing that our children are to the ir  piano lessons or 
soccer practice easy. Instead of hiking to a favori te  v is ta ,  we can 
drive to watch the sunset; instead of risking several months' journey to 
v i s i t  our relat ives across the continent we can be there in a few days' 
t rave l .  Either are available by car. The only qual i ta t ive  differences 
between how easy these various points are available to us l ies in the
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distances that need to be covered and the time and money at our disposal.  
But these differences are superf ic ial since the l imitat ions are not an 
integral part of the highway system, but only incidental to our peculiar  
ci rcumstance.
In fa c t ,  i f  there is a road that goes somewhere, we could get 
there. Thus various locations in town, in the s ta te ,  or on the conti­
nent are available to us because of a network of roads and superhighways 
which make them accessible. The interstate highway system accommodates 
our need (or desire) to v is i t  re lat ives or a national park by connecting 
us with distant c i t ies  or scenic areas. Gas stations, restaurants, and 
motels provide "accommodations": the o i l  trapped beneath the earth's
surface is extracted, d i s t i l l e d ,  and provided in consumable form at 
various points along our route so that there is l i t t l e  danger of our 
running out of gas; f ru i ts  and vegetables, meat and bread, drawn from 
various parts of the continent, are made avai lable when we become hungry 
and pull into the next restaurant; a motel procures a l l  the comforts of 
home when i t  is time to re t i re  for the evening. Such a network accom­
modates our habits of eating and blurs the differences of night and day. 
Cars, themselves, protect us from the weather. One can travel in snow 
or rain and sunroofs provide access to the warmth and radiance of f ine  
weathe r .
A contrast with walking or cross-country bicycle riding makes 
perspicuous the ease and comfort of a car. Walking to get groceries is 
physically demanding and requires large amounts of time. Since we are 
l imited by the amount we can carry, frequent tr ips are required to 
accomplish the hauling of a carload of groceries. This places more
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demand on our time as well as endurance. We may disperse the incon­
venience of having to spend a day walking back and forth to the store 
by making a habit of shopping each day. But in exchange for this we 
lose the freedom of scheduling our day. With a car the task of shopping 
is confined to one t r ip  thus making room on the other days of the week 
for other a c t iv i t ie s .  A car t r ip  across the country reduces the time of 
travel also. Biking across the continent would take weeks and would 
demand tremendous amounts of work.
But technology remains ambiguous. Since a l l  of re a l i ty  is equally 
avai lable as resource, and since the framework closes o f f  any disclosure 
other than the ordering of the real as resource, within the framework, 
one cannot distinguish between curious distractions and involvement with 
focal things. As i mentioned e a r l i e r ,  r iding my bicycle opens a world 
for  me. A cross-country bike t r ip  recovers the physical demands lost in 
driving a car. I t  challenges my endurance and exposes me to the changes 
and texture of the world. Having gained time by driving a car, i t  is not 
clear whether this benefits me v is-a-v is  the exposure I have to the world 
when riding my bicycle. To be sure, resources have been procured for 
needed and wholesome benefits. Medical resources provide health and 
v i t a l i t y ;  books, and now computers, put knowledge at our f ingert ips .
But the same framework of technology that extends the length of l i f e  
through vaccination and check-up techniques also allows us to f i l l  our 
time with video games and our stomachs with junk food. In the la t te r  
case, i t  is dubious i f  I am challenged to extend and improve myself; 
what is clear is that video games and fast food eateries l im i t  the con­
text of my part ic ipat ion.
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The framework is "tempting" in that what i t  provides is a t ran­
quil d istract ion.  Video games, which surpass the ir  mechanical kin — 
pinball  machines--dazzle the eye with flashing l ights and fast moving 
scenes. The scenes are as vivid as an adventure movie holding our 
attent ion ,  keeping us on edge with unexpected moves of the contenders. 
Only our curiosity  is taxed; the games u t i l i z e  l imited s k i l l  and are 
easi ly  accessible. "We can have i t  our way" by simply stopping at the 
nearest fast food restaurant. What makes eating this way so easy is the 
fact  that these restaurants are, more or less, uniformly and ubiquitously 
located; as are gas stations, motels, and video games. We can repeat 
our cross country t r ip  with any i t inerary .  Any store provides the same 
or comparable brand products or food. We can walk into most homes in 
this country and expect to find a comfortably maintained temperature, 
i f  we do not, we regard the instance as unusual and out of the ordinary,  
in short,  the framework provides accessibi l i ty  with re la t ive  equality  
and homogeneity within the framework. Any difference is provided for  
distract ion.  This can be accomplished because resources of energy and 
raw materials that are secured and channeled stand in the background.
So, the question of accountabil ity naturally  arises: who asked
for this framework? Thinkers of E l lu l 's  persuasion maintain that tech­
nology asserted i t s e l f ,  but as we saw e a r l i e r  this position remains 
inconclusive. Instrumentalists, such as de Jouvenel, say we have i n s t i ­
tuted the framework and remain in complete control of  i t  as a means for 
achieving certain ends.^^ This too remains s uper f ic ia l ,  for as 
Heidegger points out the framework holds sway over us. What we are 
asking here is who is responsible for the framework. Being and Time
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says we are. So long as we maintain a public a t t i tude towards tech­
nology, we freely  give up accountabil ity. The "they" deprives Dasein 
of its answerabil ity. Technology is there because of public demand; but 
what is public demand except our giving up control (and accountabil ity) 
over what and how much we genuinely need. The standards are set by the 
public: comfortable l iv ing means 2.3 children, a dog, and two cars. We 
abdicate control when we accept, unquest ioningly , the easi ly  provided 
products and the kind of l i f e  that surrounds them. We give up control 
when we accept the distractions of curiosity and foresake a rich involve­
ment with the world.
Yet technology is ambiguous; i t  does provide us with both durable 
bicycle frames and video games. This ambiguity sharpens the question of  
resp o n s ib i l i ty :  c le a r ly  not a l l  the benef its of  technology should be
abandoned. But i f  the framework i t s e l f  is ambiguous we must look outside  
i t  fo r  c r i t e r i a  to guide us. Returning to Being and Time le t  us examine 
the c r i t e r i a  Heidegger sets for  the resolution of  th is  ambiguity and the 
acquis it ion  o f  respo ns ib i l i ty .
7. The Responsibility for Technology
One takes on the responsibil i ty  of one's own involvement in the
world by moving to authentici ty . The self  of everyday Dasein Heidegger
cal ls  the "they-self"  which is inauthentic insofar as i t  takes up with
the world in idle ta lk ,  cur ios i ty ,  and a m b i g u i t y . I n  other words, an
inauthentic se l f  passes over the primordial disclosure of the world in
favor of significance articulated by the “they." The authentic s e l f ,  as
i n Rthe contrast to the inauthentic, is a modification of the inauthentic.
I f  Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings 
i t  close, i f  i t  discloses to i t s e l f  i ts  own authentic 
Being, then this discovery of the 'world' and this d is ­
closure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing 
of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of 
the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way. ^ 9
The move to authenticity is accomplished by 1) recognizing that
we are the “ they," that we f i r s t  appropriate our world by public stan­
dards, and 2) real iz ing that we have a choice in accepting this appro­
pria t ion.
V/hen Dasein thus brings i t s e l f  back from the “they," the 
they-self  is modified . . .  so that i t  becomes authentic 
being-oneself. This must be accomplished by making up 
for not choosing. But "making up" for not choosing sig-  
ni f ies  choosing to make this choice--deciding for a po­
tent ia l  ity-for-beingTTTD
Dasein understands the significance of the world in terms of a pr ior  sight 
and concern. The world is disclosed in terms of the "for-sake-of-which"  
when Dasei n finds i t s e l f  within the context of invo lvements .^  "Under­
standing is the ex is tent ia l being of Dasein's own potentia 1-for-being ; 
and i t  is so in such a way that this being discloses in i t s e l f  what its
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112being is capable o f ."  In choosing to be authentic, then, Dasein must 
move away from the poss ib i l i t ies  set forth by the "they" and recognize 
one's own capacity for involvement.
The poss ib i l i ty  of authentic existence is attested by "the voice
111of conscience" as a c a l l .  The call is to move away from the world 
of the "they." i t  rises above the chatter of idle ta lk  by s i le n t ly  
reminding Dasein of the choices i t  has not made. ^ ^  "The appeal to the 
they-self  s ignif ies summoning one's awnmost se lf  to its p o te n t ia l - fo r -  
Being, and of course as Dasein~~that is ,  as concernful Being-in-the 
world and Being with others." ^ 5  Authentic existence harkens back to the 
more fundamental, i . e . ,  foundational, mode of being involved with the 
world. The voice of conscience s ignif ies that Dasein has opted for the 
privat ive  poss ib i l i t ies  of the "they" instead of concernful involvement. 
In this way, the call of conscience counters Dasein fa l l in g  into the 
lostness of  the "they."
In recognizing that i t  has opted for certain p o ss ib i l i t ie s ,
Dasein also recognizes that i t  has excluded others. The call  of con­
science points up the fact that Dasein has, ipso fa c to , fa i led  to real ize  
certain possibi1it ies--namely authentic ones. The fa i lu re  to real ize
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these possib li t ies  Heidegger cal ls Gu i l t .  Guilt s ignif ies  not having 
carried out p o s s ib i l i t ie s ,  and Dase ? n recognizes, in the call of con­
science, that i t  is not authentic insofar as i t  accords with possi­
b i l i t i e s  art icula ted by the "they." But to acknowledge being lost in 
the world of the they is to acknowledge that the "they" tempts with the 
t r a n q u i l l i t y  of having provided Dasei n wi th p o s s ib i l i t ie s .  In Gu i l t ,  
Dasein not only recognizes the temptation of becoming lost in the public
world, but why the world of the "they" is tempting in the f i r s t  place: 
the "they" provides a place for Dase i n since i t  recognizes the uncanni­
ness of simply being thrown into the world. ^ 7  Conscience cal ls Dase? n 
back to being in the world, where Dasein must recognize of what i t  is 
capable despite the intractable givenness of the world.
When Dasein understands the call of conscience authentica l ly ,  i t  
understands the call  as an appeal to come back to the world so that i t  
can appropriate poss ib i l i t ies  which fa l l  within and highlight its 
capacities. "Hearing the appeal correctly is thus tantamount to having 
an understanding of oneself in one's own most potent ia l i ty - for -be ing"  
which, based on Gui l t ,  is not appropriating the poss ib i l i t ies  a r t ic u ­
lated by the " they ."^®  Dasein shows resolve when i t  opts for those 
po ss ib i l i t ie s  based on G u i l t ,  when Dasein opts to move into the uncanni­
ness of being thrown into the world.
8. The Ambiguity of  an Authentic Counterposition 
to Technology and Its Resolution
Heidegger does not delineate the appropriation of one's own most 
p o te n t ia l i ty  for being in terms of the foundational relat ion of involve­
ment with the world, though this would seem plausible to do, since the 
fa l l in g  of Dasei n is f a l l in g  away from circumspective concern. When we 
ask what Dasein is resolved for ,  we find that i t  is resolved only for  
i ts own most capacity (potential)  for being, based on Guil t .  But i f  
Dasein is lost in the world of the "they" and cannot distinguish genuine 
involvement with equipment from being alongside i t ,  then Dasein has no 
clue as to what would be an authentic capacity for being. This d i f f i ­
culty points to a larger ambiguity in Being and Time.
I t  is recognized that the program of Being and Time from the 
beginning is a divided task; the fa i lu re  of the foundational approach 
arises from a fundamental inconsistency of the program.'^  Heidegger 
seeks the concrete meaning of being as he tr ies  to move beyond the meta­
physical analysis of being. To accomplish this Heidegger singles out 
human beings, Dasein as a being with special access to being, and pro­
ceeds to analyze under what conditions Dasein has this special access. 
The contradiction is that the analysis is i t s e l f  transcendental, that is 
to say, by only analyzing the antecedent conditions, the poss ib i l i ty  for 
access to being is procured, but i t  f a i l s  to substantiate consequential 
matters on the basis of poss ib i l i ty .  Such a c r i t iq u e ,  however, says 
l i t t l e  in regards to Heidegger's philosophy of technology; i t  remains
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merely formal. As we have seen e a r l i e r ,  Heidegger's description of  
Dasein is not, in fact ,  universal but most accurately describes techno­
logical humankind. A closer examination is needed to discern how the 
division in Being and Time bears on Heidegger's philosophy of technology 
I f  Heidegger's analysis secures the antecedent conditions of  
Dasein's po ss ib i l i ty ,  then i t  must do so for both the authentic and inau 
thentic s e l f .  Heidegger does secure both; the d i f f i c u l t y  is that Hei­
degger wants to reject on the concrete, substantive level the inauthenti 
involvement of the "they" as manifest in technological l iv in g ,  but can­
not because a transcendental analysis w i l l  determine ind i f fe ren t ly  with­
out evaluation a l l  fundamental poss ib i l i t ies  of human existence. Indeed 
Heidegger, though he sets o f f  the work world of the craftsman against 
technological devices such as the radio, is not consistent with his 
examples. "Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand
not only in the domestic world of the workshop but also in the publi c
120 ■ . . . . . . .world." Consequently technological exploitation is indistinguishable
from the usefulness of tools in the craftsman's workshop. "The wood is 
a forest of  timber, the mountain a quarry of rock; the r iver is water­
power, the wind is wind ' in the s a i l s ‘ ."121 Heidegger retracts in "The
Question Concerning Technology" the idea that such public disclosure as
1 ??resource could be the same as the disclosure of a focal thing.
But how does the tension between technological ordering of 
resources and the disclosure of significance resolve the ambiguity of 
the "they"? To be sure, the "they" embodies technological l iv ing and 
hence is inauthentic. Authentic l iv ing is marked by resolve for one's 
own capacity for being. But Being and Time, consistent with its
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transcendental approach gives no concrete indication as to what this  
might be. The difference between technological ordering and a focal 
thing pivots on the unbroken context of significance articula ted by that 
thing. Indeed, the involvement with a focal thing discloses a world 
which is vastly d i f ferent  from the tranquil distraction of technology.
I f  a focal thing sets i t s e l f  o f f  against technology then a capacity for  
response to such things becomes the cr i ter ion for authentic l iv ing .  
Heidegger resolves the ambiguity of the "they," and ult imately the ten­
sion between securing antecedent conditions and those consequential 
matters of  concern, by looking to things in the ir  disclosive s i g n i f i ­
cance.
The primordial disclosure l ies in a thing's focal power: the four­
fold is disclosed through a part icu lar  thing; significance is gathered 
and focused. This disclosure is not secured in that one may not always 
have access to the depth of the world when one involves oneself with a 
thing. I am not guaranteed an exhilerat ing ride when I get on my b i ­
cycle even though I have had such experiences in the past. Indeed, a
par t icu lar  ride may prove to be agony. I may be riding into a strong
headwind; the physical exertion required to ride increases and I am a l 1
too unpleasantly aware that this ride is not fun, not enjoyable, but
simply a lot of  work--work I am not enthused about doing. I t  contrasts
with other rides where wind and weather have shown themselves as ex­
h i le ra t ing  challenges. What is not secured is knowing in advance how
the world w i l l  be disclosed, or the guarantee that the disclosure w i l l
be f r u i t f u l  and i l luminating.  There are occasionally dark moments in 
our involvement with focal things. Nonetheless, I do know that my
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bicycle affords me the opportunity for an exhi lerat ing experience of 
using my muscles even though I am not in control of those experiences. 
Within the framework of technology, however, that control is secured: 
resources are channeled so that ,  on command, the environment for a 
pleasant experience is avai lable. In the comfort and security of an a r ­
cade, video games supply d istract ive  delight. One only has to supply 
the quarters to be captivated by a game of "Pac-Man." The extent to 
which one is carried away depends, of course, on our pr ior  disposition,  
but enough distraction w i l l  mitigate any depression or anxiety so long 
as we give ourselves over to whatever we allow to capture our a ttention.
In the arcade the means of distraction is secured: there is no outside
intervention save the buzz and bleeps of others involved in other games. 
This, too, may be eliminated: video games, as well as fu l l  length
movies, may be played in the privacy of one's home.
We can see more perspicuously that the cr i ter ion  of authenticity  
l ies  in focal things when we concentrate on recognizing po ten t ia l i ty  for  
being as a capacity, a capacity for human dignity. "This dignity l ies
in keeping watch over the unconcealment--and with i t ,  from the f i r s t ,
1 2 3the concealment--of a ll  coming to presence on this earth ."  J This d ig­
n i ty  is guarding the disclosure, not forsaking its  ground simply because 
the ground does not always reveal.  Authenticity, then, means being ready, 
being open for the disclosure which comes in focal things. I f  we opt 
for the security of the framework of technolpgy, i f  we give ourselves 
over to the dictates of the "they," then the disclosive ground, the focus 
of significance in a thing is levelled over with and by avai lable d is ­
tract ion.  By seeking the security of  always being disburdened, by
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f i l l i n g  our time with technological d istract ion,  we give up on involving 
ourselves with the significance of the world. Capacity is making room 
for  and being sensitive to the significance by developing a patient  
attention to things. Within this patient attention l ies our human dig­
n i t y ,  for the patience awaits, and thus guards, the significance of the 
world. By learning how to tune properly and adjust my bicycle, by 
attending to which gear rat io  has the least amount of pedal resistance 
on a par t icu lar  h i l l ,  by sharing the workload with another biker through 
lead changes and draf t ing ,  a strong headwind becomes a challenge, not an 
obstacle. The resistance demands that I u t i l i z e  my s k i l l  and acquain­
tance with my bike i f  I am to be e f fec t ive ,  e f f i c ie n t ,  and elegant in 
r iding.  But I must have already developed the capacity to u t i l i z e  s k i l l  
for executing the proper movements in response to the challenge given to 
me by the headwind.
The significance of that challenge does not leave me even as I 
true my wheels, for here I am preparing for and anticipating i t  even 
though I do not know when i t  calls on me. The unbroken context of in ­
volvement embodies the capacity as a making room for significance. With­
in the framework of technology the capacity for significance shrinks as 
involvement with devices narrows and withdraws. In the context of 
tuning a television set,  involvement is narrowed to my turning knobs to 
eliminate annoying distort ions, and withdraws altogether in the case of 
s e l f  adjusting sets. The capacity for significance is reduced to pas­
sively  s i t t in g  in front of the screen. I f ,  however, the scope of my 
involvement is expanded the space created for u t i l i z in g  s k i l l ,  the 
capacity for significance, need not always be f i l l e d ,  and in fact cannot
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be. All rides may not be exhilerat ing and joyous; my ride on the road to 
work may not be part icu lar ly  s t r ik ing ,  but rather uneventful or even 
agonizing. S t i l l  I should not neglect the care of my bike, for even the 
uneventfulness of the ride opens me to the fact that significance and 
grandeur is not within my control,  that I must wait and be prepared for 
i t .
The call  of conscience, then, as a formal structure i l lus tra tes  
how we may take responsibil i ty for technology and at the same time re­
solves the d i f f i c u l t y  of freedom in Heidegger's mature works. "Unless 
man f i r s t  establishes himself before hand in the space proper to his
essence and there takes up his dwelling, he w i l l  not be capable of any-
12 Athing essential within the destining now holding sway." The call of 
conscience is the call to make up for the lack of choice when one abdi­
cates one's choices to the public world. Such a "choice" passes over the 
development of capacity and sens i t iv i ty  to focal things, a capacity which 
is proper to the highest dignity be f i t t ing  a human being.
We f i r s t  appropriate the world in terms of the "they," since we 
are born into the "they." Such acculturation is real ly  no choice at all  
but our start ing point in choosing how we may appropriate the world.
V/e make a choice against the background of the "they" and the challenging 
1 25of technology. J But the choice is not simply against the framework
but rather one that allows focal things to or ient us.
Heidegger articulates the disclosure of significance along the 
dimensions of the fourfold—earth, sky, mortals, and the d iv in i t i e s .  We 
as mortals find ourselves within the disclosure because the dimension of
being mortal is mirrored in each of the other dimensions, within the
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focus of the fourfold as a whole. Humans are under sky, on earth,  
looking toward the d iv in i t i e s .  But the fourfold also shows within  the 
mirrorplay, the focus and gathering of the world, what calls us to be in 
the place opened up within the dimensions. When we choose to make room 
for focal things through patient a ttention, we guide ourselves by the 
direction provided by a thing and place ourselves within the area opened 
up. The man who tends the vineyard knows his mortal ity  in terms of the 
grapes, the s o i l ,  the sun and rain, and the l ibations offered in thanks; 
he knows what his daily tasks are through that a ttention, and he knows 
the meaning of his l i f e  in terms of his mortality and those daily tasks.
The choice, then, is both to take responsibil i ty  for technology, 
i . e . ,  make i t  our own, and to come to terms with our dignity that is our 
essence.
However, in order that man in his essence may become atten­
t ive  to the essence of technology and in order that there 
may be founded an essential relationship between tech­
nology and man in respect to their  essence, modern man must 
f i r s t  and above a l l  f ind his way back into the fu l l  breadth 
of the space proper to his essence. ^
By coming out of the "they" we recognize technology for what i t  is: the
framework secures resources to make them available and orders the real
such that i t  discloses i t s e l f  only as resource. In the separation from
the "they" and the subsequent coming into our own we become sensitive to
and allow for othermodesof disclosure. This separation comes in choosing
whether one should opt for the disburdenment of technology, and this
choice means taking responsibil i ty  for when and where we allow technology
to come into our l ives.
In choosing to take our orientation from focal things we dissolve
the ambiguity of  technology and in so doing determine which antecedent 
conditions should be secured, what disburdenment is proper to the atten­
tion to focal things and would not in terfere with the ir  disclosure. To 
be sure, technology disburdens us so that one may have the opportunity 
to tune a bicycle or prepare a festive meal, but in contrast the oppor­
tunity is squandered when we turn to video games and fast food. I f  we 
opt for the la t te r  and choose the disclosure of re a l i ty  as resource for
our d istract ion,  then we allow the framework to guide us. In e ffect  we
choose to neglect things and we must accept the consequences. Taking 
responsibil i ty for technology means accepting the disburdenment but on 
terms we have appropriated as our own, i . e . ,  to the service of attention  
to other things and their  revelations. The problem is ,  as Heidegger 
points out, that there are always poss ib i l i t ies  (and significances) one 
fa i ls  to act on and ipso facto must neglect in order to act on others.  
But one must act toward, respond to , something in order to be responsibl
Simply to opt for video games and microwaves is not to take re­
sponsibil ity  at a l l .  To accept wholeheartedly the distraction of tech­
nology is abdication. In this case one has not appropriated the world 
as one's own, but instead adopts what kind of l i f e  is avai lable and 
v iv i f i e d  in advertisement. The movement out of the "they" means re­
sponding to something on one's own terms, and not lapse into the comfort 
of a pretext that is conveniently avai lable.  Response means opening our 
selves to what a thing reveals and acting according to what is appro­
pr ia te  to that disclosure. Being sensitive to current and a part icu lar
set of rapids, a boatman deft ly  positions the boat, enters the rapids,
pushes hard on the oars at the crests of swells, slips o f f  the sides of
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1 27rocks to avoid the boils on the other side. I f  one wanted to be
pleasantly distracted, one could avoid challenging rapids or ride the 
aqua coaster at an amusement park. Technology, in its  deb i l i ta t in g  
form, "responds," not with s k i l l  but levels down the s k i l l  needed, so 
that significance becomes just  so t i t i l l a t i n g .
But technology may help open up a world for us. Lighter bicycle 
frames and components challenge one to ride harder and faster; l ighter  
kayaks make maneuvering easier thus making available rapids which require 
the s k i l l  of agile maneuvering . Video games, on the other hand, only 
develop eye-hand coordination. The difference between the two worlds 
should be more than obvious. A game of "Pac-Man" l imits us to viewing 
a fluorescent screen in a black box; running a r iver  or riding a bicycle 
opens us to a f u l le r  world: there is the feel of cold water, the smell
of  fresh a i r ,  the fu l l  use of  one's body, the surrounding trees and rocks 
under which, and on top o f ,  one can lay in rest.  Taking responsibil i ty  
for technology means making room within one's l i f e  for significance based 
on such focal things.
We move to choose individually  on those occasions when we decide 
to take our cue from focal things. Such occasions seem endless: on a
windy day I can choose to ride my bike with s k i l l  or to drive the car to 
work; 1 can f i l l  my time by dropping quarters into video games or i can 
read the classics; I can always have music through a good stereo unit or 
I could purchase a musical instrument and learn to play i t .  On those in ­
dividual occasions for decision, the choice manifests i t s e l f  as a choice 
between responding with s k i l l  and knowledge or opting for easy a v a i l ­
a b i l i t y .  Granted, not everyone should or can be a gu ita r is t  or poet or
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commuter by bicycle,  but to eliminate a l l  poss ib i l i t ies  of challenge 
through technological a v a i la b i l i t y  runs against the grain of human 
dign ity ,  of being open and responsive to significance. As individuals 
we respond to significance in d i f fe rent  ways according to our in d i ­
vidual make-up. Being responsible means that we appropriate focal 
things on the basis of our personal capacities.
Yet not a l l  of our actions are in d iv idua l is t ic :  we do move and
act co l lect ive ly  as a community. The questions of responsibil i ty  for  
technology enter into the forums where decisions about community l i f e  
arise. As a community we decide on the qual ity  of education for our­
selves and our children, of our immediate surroundings, of the kind of 
work we seek and endorse. The choices are decided in various p o l i t ic a l  
forums: lo ca l ,s ta te ,  and national e lections, referendums, lobbying our 
representatives. The questions about whether we wish to expand the 
framework of technology in our collect ive lives pose themselves when the 
framework affects us a l l :  the question of nuclear arms, the question of
a continental pipeline are forums within which we discuss what kind of  
l i f e  we wish to lead. But the questions need not be so global; the same 
question of responsibil i ty  arises when we need to discuss and choose
what kind of industry we want to se t t le  in our area or whether we want
128large public transportation such as an a irport .
We take responsibil i ty  for technology, also, when we decide on 
how we should celebrate, communally, the things which we a l l  share in 
common--clean a i r  and water, open spaces and wild r ivers ,  and our identity  
as a community and species. The choice is to acknowledge and honor these 
things in the ir  own right or eliminate what they re f lec t  by allowing
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the framework to establish and provide what we should share in common.
By reading Heidegger's mature works through Being and Time we 
f i l l  out the austere (and sometimes pessimistic) picture Heidegger por­
trays. In doing so we also gain an understanding of the counterbalance 
to technology which is more applicable to our own lives,  for i t  is the 
day-to-day world in which we l ive  and encounter the framework of tech­
nology. Technology disburdens us and provides distractions When we use 
the toaster and shower in the morning, drive the car to the shopping 
mall to do our errands, call fr iends on the telephone for an afternoon 
conversation, or put dinner in the microwave and s i t  down for an evening 
of relaxation in front of  the television set.  Such every day encounters 
are what is most insidious; they are so close to us that we barely 
recognize them for what they are--a  severance from involvement. We are 
too used to seeing the framework of  technology as imposing, as embodied 
in the Vehicle Assembly Building at Cape Canaveral, Hewlett-Packard 
calculators, "CAT" scanners, or the skyline of downtown Chicago. But we 
can, ancK-usually do, insulate ourselves from such towering examples of 
technology. We do this by retreat ing back into the framework through 
purchased travel packages or a movie played on a home video cassette re­
corder. Yet we do not see the retreat as part of the framework i t s e l f .  
Such day-to-day encounters appear to be harmless, even he lp fu l ,  d is­
tractions from the severance from things or deb i l i ta t in g  labor.
9.  Working out the Appropr ia t ion  o f  Technology
How, then, can we reconcile the openness to focal things with
our inevitable reliance on technology? Heidegger suggests that
we can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also 
keep ourselves free o f  them, that we may le t  go of them 
any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to 
be used, and also le t  them alone as something which does 
not a f fect  our inner and real core. We can aff i rm  the 
unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them 
the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse and lay 
waste our nature.
. . .  I would call, this comportment toward technology 
which expresses Myes" ancl at the same time "no" by an 
old word, releasement toward things. ^ 9
For Heidegger the counterforce to the framework is a "release­
ment towards things" exemplified in the work world of the craftsman; i t  
is In this environment that things are encountered ready-to-hand, i . e . ,  
in the ir  f u l l ,  involved contextual richness. For us this kind of work 
epitomizes the counterforce to the framework in focal things and the 
practices which surround them. I t  embodies the confluence of the mature 
Heidegger's notion of a focal thing and dwelling in the world, as well as 
Being and Time's rich everydayness. This confluence shows us to the 
focal thing there belongs the human response of a practice.
The workworld of  the craftsman embodies Heidegger's notion being-
in-the-world in that i t  exemplifies an environment where the ready-to-  
1 30hand is close-by. J I t  is through concernful circumspection that one
judges whether e n t i t ies  are within reach, close-by, or far  away.
The Objective distances of Things present-at-hand do not 
coincide with the remoteness or closeness of what is 
ready-to-hand within the world. Though we may know these
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distances exactly , this knowledge s t i l l  remains blind; 
i t  does not have the function of discovering the environ­
ment circumspectively and bringing i t  close by; this 
knowledge is used only in and for a concernful Being 
which does not measure stretches— a Being towards the 
world that ‘matters' to ope.131
Concernful circumspection understands the ready-to-hand as close or re­
mote in terms of how the ready-to-hand reveals i t s e l f .
One summer I had the opportunity to watch and help a craftsman at 
his trade. From this experience of working in a tinshop I came to an under 
standing of how tools are used in work and how in that use a world is 
disclosed along with the or ientation i t  provided in that world. The 
measurement of  a corner on a steeple means more to the tinsmith than so 
many inches from this notch and so many from that piece of wrought iron.
The tinsmith is interested in capping the steeple and the dimensions are 
made with the foresight of this concern, anticipating problems and i n t r i ­
cacies. The top of the tower is not perfectly  square, so the perimeter 
of the cap w i l l  have to be adjusted so that i t  looks squared o f f .  The 
seam of the cap would look best i f  i t  were on an edge, so the smith must 
decide which direction the edge w i l l  least l ike ly  be seen. Consequently 
the direction of that edge determines what measurements the sides of the 
base w i l l  be. Then there are the adjustments to be made for the various 
notches and protrusions at the top of the tower. And while the smith 
looks over these problems, he considers how the cap w i l l  be attached.
The various rivets and fasteners at his shop, or the creation of a cus­
tom anchor come to mind. Though he stands on the roof of a country 
church at a crossroads miles from his shop, his circumspective concern 
draws together both the tools and the s k i l l s  he w i l l  need to complete
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the task. The tower, as ready-to-hand, orients him as to what must be 
considered: the measurements for the cap mean nothing unless he has
given thought as to what the cap is fo r ,  where i t  should s i t  on the 
tower, and how i t  should be assembled. Only against and in conjunction 
with the background of this significance does "three feet four-and- 
three quarter inches on the southwest edge" make sense.
But le t  us not forget that this measurement always carries
reference to the rest of  his considerations. I t  w i l l ' t a k e  the smith the
morning to cut and mark the sheet of Copper from which he w i l l  make the
cap. The morning for him is not eight to twelve; time is not measured
1T2by the clock, rather by the estimation based on his past work. J He 
begins by setting the shop in order, gathering his tools, clearing the 
workbench, selecting the materials. He has no sheet large enough to 
make a one-piece cap, but there are two sheets each s u f f ic ie n t ly  large 
to make h a l f .  This the smith had not ant icipated. The lack o f  material 
for  his i n i t i a l  plan dictates the a lternat ive of  making a two-piece cap. 
He thinks back to the steeple and how such a cap would look. A pinched 
seam would work best, giving symmetry to the cap. He then decides to 
make false seams on the other two edges creating complete symmetry about 
the cap.
He lays down the f i r s t  sheet deciding which two directions these 
two faces w i l l  look. He turns to his measurements then begins to lay out 
the l ines. For this task the smith scratches the lines with an awl and 
stra ight edge. He deft ly  marks f i r s t  the far  edge of the cap then a 
l ine half  an inch paralle l to that;  then one nine-sixteenths from the 
la s t ,  then one nine-sixteenths further out. This last l ine is a
7^
reference l ine:  the seam w i l l  end here and the smith must move so far
over at the base before he can s tar t  the next seam. When i t  comes time 
to break, to bend the sheet at the various l ines, the smith starts  at 
th is  reference l in e ,  moves to the f i r s t  l ine nine-sixteenths from i t ,  
and breaks the sheet up, . i . e . , '  bends i t  to a near right angle, folding 
the lines together. The next break w i l l  be nine-sixteenths away on the 
l ine second from the edge. The resulting creases w i l l  look l ike  a "G" 
(or an upside down "GM depending on which end you are a t ) . The "Gs" 
from each ha l f  are slipped one inside the other, then pinched to keep 
them from spreading apart. But before he can break the sheet, a l l  the 
lines must be marked. From the 1ine which w i11 be the edge, he marks 
o f f  the base, for i t  is from here that the length of the rest of the 
edges w i l l  be determined. The cap must look square, the height of the 
cap is f ixed,  so the edges must reach to the corners of the base as well 
as account for the pitch of  the top of the tower. At each measurement 
the smith stops and ponders, v isualiz ing how the cap w i l l  s i t .
With both sheets marked the smith cuts the edges of the cap. He
gently slides the bottom of  the sheers underneath the metal, the scrap 
always on the right hand side. He squeezes f i rm ly ,  evenly, almost to 
the edge but not closing down a l l  the way. The morning has turned to 
early afternoon and he returns home for a b i te  to eat .  When the meal is 
f inished he chats with his wife for a while , asking how her day is pro­
gressing. The smith pauses, reminded of his work, and departs for the 
shop.
There he begins to break the sheets. A break is a tool which
holds sheet metal between two leaves, one stationary, one l i f t i n g  up so
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as to create an opening which holds the sheet in place when the leaf  is 
dropped again. A third  lea f ,  placed on a pivot, is pulled up and around, 
folding the secured sheet of metal. The smith places the sheet in the 
break and aligns i t  surely and s w if t ly .  His motions are smooth, honed by 
years of practice. The crease is exactly where he wants i t .  He moves to 
the next break, then to the next. When a l l  the breaks are made the 
halves are f i t t e d  together and must now be pounded on the anvi l .  The 
anvil w i l l  not reach to the very point of the cap, so he must cantilever  
on his bench a long bar, rotated so that the corner of the bar is per­
pendicular to the f loor .  The seam rests on the bar creating a sharp 
angle against which the smith pinches the seam and pounds a corner.
F irst  he taps f l a t  the expanded "Gs," then returns to the top, pounding 
down the seam, returning again str ik ing with harder blows. Such a seam 
must be shaped and worked with each s t r ik e .  Towards the bottom he can 
transfer his work to a long, slender-nosed anvi l .
The cap is seamed together and the day is almost done. The smith 
t id ies  the shop, putting away his make-shift anv i l ,  and gathers the tools 
he w i l l  need for the morrow. With this done and time to spare, he turns 
to smaller projects, ones he does during the moments between larger jobs.
The next day the smith solders the inside: of each seam and f i l l s  
the t ip .  He cleans the copper surface by brushing i t  with acid. The 
soldering iron is heated in a small stove unti l  the head is red hot, then 
slowly runs i t  along the seam. Behind the iron he feeds the solder and 
f lu x ,  melting i t  by touching the hot sheet and not the iron. With the 
sheet hot, the solder melts and flows into the crack; i f  the smith 
melted i t  only on the iron, the f lu id  would cool before i t  had a chance
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to penetrate the seam. The process is slow: the iron must be constantly
cleaned and reheated. The smith must'move the solder only "so far"  
from the iron so that the surfaces are hot enough tomelt the solder but 
the iron and solder are not in contact. The process is most d i f f i c u l t  
near the top of the cap where there is l i t t l e  room to work.
In the afternoon the smith is ready to place the cap on the tower. 
For this he has enl isted the help of a neighbor. The two men hoist the 
cap onto the roof, then set i t  on the tower to see how i t  f i t s .  With 
only,mi nor trimming the cap sets snuggly, and the two men climb down to
see i f  i t  appears to be plumb. Satisfied that i t  is ,  the smith marks
the holes for the r ive ts .  The neighbor holds the cap over a bar placed 
on the inside of an edge as an anvil while the smith punches the holes 
using a punch and hammer. When the holes are bored the men return the 
cap to the top of  the tower. The neighbor must now "buck" the r ivets .  
Holding a piece of iron shaped l ike one used to press clothes (but 
d e f in i te ly  more massive), this man pushes against the flange of the r ive t .  
The flange is on the inside of the tower, the head passing through the 
wrought iron frame at the top of  the tower, through the copper cap and 
protrudi.ng far  enough for the smith to point down and round out the head. 
The man on the inside must push the iron t ight  against the flange, pro­
viding backing so that the smith can have a solid blow on the r iv e t .
When the rivet ing is done, the smith solders the corners of the base and 
cleans up. The day is f in ished, and he and his neighbor return home, the
smith ready to turn to a new job, a new task.
In such a work world we can see that the smith's involvement with 
his tools provides seamless reference to the purpose of the job and its
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context, a cap for the steeple of a country church, other tools and the 
materials avai lable . Though one or more aspects of his work fade into 
the background, they move forward when what called his attention is 
answered. The type of  seam was called into question when the smith 
found he had to work with two separate sheets o f  metal instead of one; 
but he did not lose contact with his tools when this happened. Once he 
responded to the material at hand and decided that i t  called for such 
and such a style seam, he understood what tools were needed for that
task. The ent i re  job only makes sense in terms of the tower on that
part icu lar  church at those crossroads. The measurements and his choosing 
which side should face what direction a t test  to that.
But more so, such work orients the tinsmith's day-to-day l i f e :
the measurement of daily  time is in terms of the work at hand. His
involvement, centered on the tools of his trade, comes in the form of  
practicing s k i l l .  Practice, not simply in the sense of acquiring s k i l l ,  
but also in the sense of a repet i t ive  Tnvolvement with those tools. The 
smith is involved in the practice of cutting,  breaking, and soldering 
mater ia l ; in  the practice of  making caps, or chests, or custom pieces for 
stoves. His practice of s k i l l s  opens him up to involvement with the 
things ready-to-hand in the workshop. Others, too, are not left .  out.
The smith considers the view the parishioners w i1i have o f  the steeple 
when he ponders how to set the cap. He asks the pastor out of what 
material would he l ike  the cap to be made, and barters with him about 
the work to be done. He calls  on his neighbor for help, and enjoys the 
quiet break at midday with his wife .
10. Dwelling as the Counterforce to Technology
S t i l l  we must remember that such a world cannot be delimited 
s t r i c t l y  in Being and Time, for Heidegger here cannot distinguish the 
authentic from the inauthentic. Such a dist inction only comes, in con­
sequential form, in his mature works. The confluence of the richness of 
such a world with the mature Heidegger's d e f in i t ive  embrace of things 
f i l l s  out and i l lus t ra tes  that kind of 1i fe  which is the counterforce 
to technology. The t i t l e  of such a l i f e  may be found in dwelling.
Let me begin by elaborating dwelling in the world in terms of 
authentic i ty . As we have noted, authenticity means a resolve for one's 
own capacity for the world: human dignity is found in keeping watch
over an area which we remember as having disclosed to us in the past the 
significance of the world. Such authent ic i ty , is marked by waiting for 
significance, not forsaking the ground which reveals i t  by giving oui— 
selves over to the distraction of technology. We must open ourselves to 
significance by attending to those things which we have found to focus 
that significance. Such attention is indicative of preservation: 
significance does not always show i t s e l f  when we want or expect i t . ^ ^  
Good runs are not always guaranteed whenever we set foot to ground. We 
must wait ;  we must be ready for i t .  But we can only be ready in a space 
we have provided, and preserved for our involvement. Since significance  
is focused in things, as Heidegger describes them, then we must keep 
them safe, for i t  is in our involvement with focal things which is our 
being open to significance. We must not forsake and abandon them when
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they "do not d e l i v e r b u t  remember that i t  is through them that the 
significance of the world shows i t s e l f ,  and that part of our involvement, 
as attent ion,  means we must wait for i t .  The vigor of a good run, the 
greeting of fresh smells of earth rising in the a i r ,  and the sOngs of 
morning birds come when we run, but they do not always meet us. S t i l l ,  
i f  we are to enjoy such a glimpse of the beauty of the world, we must 
continue to run, even though the run the next day is labored, for i t  is 
in running that we gain access to this significance. What practice 
shows us is that we overcome lapses in the disclosure of significance 
through regularity  and commitment. But continuing to practice our in ­
volvement with focal things, we preserve the ground which reveals the 
significance of the world. But a practice also reveals something about 
our relationship to significance. Because the greatness of the world is 
not under, our control,  we need a practice; for in a practice we accept 
significance as greater than ourselves and respond to i t  with humili ty ,  
i . e . ,  we respond to i t  as something to be cherished.
Heidegger only hints at practice as human involvement which leaves 
room for the greatness of the world, yet a l l  the elements are there.
The thrust of Heidegger’ s counter to technology l ies  in releasement 
towards, rather than neglect o f ,  things. He shows us the focal power of 
things but never e x p l i c i t ly  suggests ways to preserve them; his mature 
works point to the breadth o f  preservation, yet this lacks an everyday 
expression; Being and Time emphasizes involvement in an unbroken context 
of significance and everydayness, but the import of this is lost in the 
ambiguity of the book. A focal practice, I bel ieve, as involvement 
surrounding a thing which discloses the significance of the world, brings
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in to  r e l i e f  the emphasis o f  involvement w h i le  a t  the same time i t  points  
to  the breadth o f  p re se rv a t io n .
In broader terms, Heidegger describes t h i s  preservat ion  as 
dwe 1 l i n g .
Real sparing is something p o s i t i v e  and takes place when we 
leave something beforehand in i t s  own n a tu re ,  when we 
return i t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  to i t s  be ing ,  when we " f r e e "  i t  
in the real sense o f  the word in to  a preserve o f  peace.
To d w e l l ,  to be set a peace,  means to remain a t  peace 
w i t h in  the f r e e ,  the p reserve ,  the freesphere th a t  s a f e ­
guards each thing  in i t s  n a tu re .  The fundamental char ­
a c t e r  o f  dwel1 ing is t h is  sparing and p re s e rv in g . 11 
pervades dwe ll ing  in i t s  whole range. That range r e ­
veals i t s e l f  to us as soon as we r e f l e c t  th a t  human being  
consists  in d w e l l in g  and, indeed, dwell ing  in the sense 
of  the stay  o f  mortals  on the e a r t h . 134
The smith preserves when he accepts t h a t  c e r t a in  gauges o f  metal behave 
in c e r t a in  ways and they must be handled each in i t s  own way. Copper 
cuts d i f f e r e n t l y  from galvanized s t e e l ;  each demands i t s  own way o f  
sheer ing.  The smith preserves th is  d i f f e r e n c e  when he uses the l i g h t e r  
snips fo r  the copper instead o f  c u t t in g  e i t h e r  sheet w i th  a band saw.
He a lso preserves when, on days when things go wrong, he continues to  
handle the m ate r ia l  in the same ways he has b e fo re ,  ra th e r  than o v e r -  
coming the d i f f i c u 1 t i e s  w i th  technologica l  fo rc e .  Such preservat ion  is 
tak ing  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  technology in choosing to remain w i th  one's  
s k i l l s  even when they tem p o ra r i1y f a i 1 him. Instead o f  f o ld in g  over the 
edge and spot welding i t  to the s id e ,  he continues and attempts to f i n i s h  
the  i n t r i c a t e  crimped seam o f  the l i d  to a tool  chest.
But as Heidegger in d ic a t e s ,  preservat ion  and s e t t in g  f r e e  p e r ­
vades sw e l l in g  in i t s  whole range.
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The o ld  word bauen to  which the b?n belongs, answers: 
ich bin du b i s t  means, I d w e l l ,  you d w e l l .  The way in 
which, you are and I am, the manner in which we are  
humans on th is  e a r t h ,  is Bauen, d w e l l ing .  To be a 
human being means to be aon ear th  as a morta l .  I t  
means to  dwel1 .135
D w el l ing ,  then,  is not j u s t  p reservat ion  o f  p r a c t ic e s ;  d w e l l ing  ranges 
over the dimensions o f  the f o u r f o l d .  We may only d w e l l ,  we may only  
preserve ,  in terms o f  "being on e a r t h . "  The "s tay  o f  the morta ls"  i n d i ­
cates the range o f  our d w e l l in g  on e a r th  in th a t  e a r th  points  to the  
sky,  and mortals awai t  the d i v i n i t i e s .  The range o f  dwe ll ing  a lready  
moves w i t h in  the world in the dimensions o f  the f o u r f o ld ;  to say "being  
on ear th  as morta l"  c a r r ie s  w i th  i t  the unspoken dimensions o f  being 
under sky looking towards the d i v i n i t i e s .  Reminiscent o f  Being and T ime, 
we are in - th e -w o r ld  (emphasized by i t s  hyphenat ion) ;  we move w i t h in  the 
world in h a b i t in g  the f o u r f o ld .
S t i l l ,  how is i t _ t h a t  we move w i t h in  these dimensions?
How do mortals make t h e i r  d w e l l in g  such a preserving?
Morta ls would never be capable o f  i t  i f  dw e l l in g  were 
merely a s tay ing under the sky,  be fore  the d i v i n i t i e s  
among m orta ls .  Ra ther ,  dwell ing  i t s e l f  is always a 
s tay ing  w i th  th ings .  . . .
. . . Dwell ing preserves the fo u r f o ld  by br ing ing  
the presencing o f  the fo u r f o ld  in to  th ings .  But 
th ings themselves secure the f o u r f o ld  only when they  
themselves as_ things are  l e t  be in t h e i r  p re s e n c in g .^ ®
This securing is not the securing o f  resources by the framework o f  tech­
nology,  but the p reservat ion  o f  the fo u r f o ld  focused in a th in g .  Things 
d isc lose  the dimensions o f  the world when they are allowed to be. The 
awl is to etch the sheets o f  metal and can only be put to th a t  use when 
we recognize tha t  the pointed t i p  scratches the s ur fa ce .  To f re e  the 
awl means th a t  in conjunct ion w i th  the recogni t ion  we use i t  f o r  p r e c is e ly
th a t  purpose. The awl o f  course re fe rs  to the work being done by the  
t insm ith  and in t h i s  way draws near the fo u r f o ld .
Mortals stay w i th  th in g s ,  a l low  the fo u r fo ld  to be disclosed in
th ings when mortals b u i I d . "D w e l l in g ,  in s o fa r  as i t  keeps o r  secures
the f o u r f o ld  in things i s ,  as th is  keeping,  a b u i I d i n g . " 1^  Heidegger's
p reservat ion  is not a b l in d  and s t e r i l e  museum c u ra to rsh ip ;  things are
not "put away," but n e i t h e r  is i t  the storage o f  resources.  Dwell ing
c a r r ie s  w i th  i t  the a c t iv e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  f i r s t  c i t e d  in Being and Time:
b u i ld in g  is the making o f  things which i n s t a l l  and admit ,  focus and d i s -
138c lo se ,  the f o u r f o l d ,  the dimensions o f  the world wherein we dw e l l .
Such b u i ld in g  is markedly d i f f e r e n t  from the construct ion and expansion 
c a r r ie d  out by technology.  The d i f f e r e n c e  shows i t s e l f  in the th in g ,  
f o r  things gather  and focus the w o r ld ,  technological  devices disburden 
and d i s t r a c t  us.
In Being and Time " l e t t i n g  an e n t i t y  be involved . . . consists  in 
prev ious ly  f r e e in g  i t  fo r  i t s  readiness-to-hand w i t h in  the e n v i ro n ­
m e n t . " ^ ^  Such freedom is f o r  s e r v i c e a b i l i t y ,  u s a b i l i t y  to which the  
e n t i t y  as equipment is s u i te d .  The awl is su i ted  fo r  marking the su r ­
face o f  meta l .  But the involvement and subsequent 
th in g  in Heidegger 's  mature thought is w i thou t  the 
s et  Being and Time. Bu i ld ing  means, e m p h a t ic a l ly ,  
th ings .
The b r id g e ,  which we have mentioned be fore ,  
f o r  He idegger . I t  gathers the f o u r f o ld :  i t  spans
crossing over the water  fed by the sky; mortals t r a v e l  to and from the  
banks to do t h e i r  tasks in thanksgiv ing to the d i v i n i t i e s .
" l e t t i n g  be" o f  a 
ambiguit ies  which be-  
staying  ("being")  w i th
serves as an example 
the r i f t  in the e a r th
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To be su re ,  the bridge is  a th ing o f  i t s  own kind;  
f o r  i t  gathers the fo u r f o ld  in such a way that,  i t  al lows  
a i s i t e  f o r  i t .  But on ly  something that  is i t s e l f  a locat ion  
can make space fo r  a s i t e .  The lo c a t io n  is not a lready  
there  before  the bridge i s .  Before the br idge stands,  
there are o f  course many spots along the stream th a t  can 
be occupied by something. One o f  them proves to be a 
l o c a t io n ,  and does so because o f  the b r i d g e .. Thus the  
br idge  does n o t ' f i r s t  come to a lo c a t io n  to stand in i t ;  
ra th e r  a locat ion  comes in to  ex is tence  only  by v i r t u e  o f  
the b r idge .  The br idge is a th in g ;  i t  gathers the f o u r ­
f o l d ,  but in such a way th a t  i t  al lows a s i t e  fo r  the 
f o u r f o ld .  By t h i s  s i t e  are determined the l o c a l i t i e s  
and ways by which a space is provided fo r
Allowing a s i t e  means focusing the f o u r f o ld :  the world is concre te ly
gathered and d isclosed in th a t  place where the br idge spans from bank to
bank. I t  is  here when the br idge  v au l ts  in to  the sky,  th a t  the sky 's
s ig n i f ic a n c e  is brought forward.  The bridge contrasts  w i th  the sky by
14lmoving in to  i t ,  by moving across the stream fed by the ra in s .  One 
dimension does not stand a lone;  i t  m irrors  the o t h e r s ,  too.  I t  connects 
the ear th  f o r  mortals  to  do t h e i r  work in thanksgiv ing .  The locat ion  o f  
the br idge  is the disclosed s i t e  o f  the wor ld ;  the locat ion  is the place  
where e a r th  and sky,  d i v i n i t i e s  and morta ls  meet.
In the same way the smith ,  along w i th  the closeness o f  his work 
w o r ld ,  moves about the lo c a t io n  o f  the church.  The cap sheds the ra in  
o f  the sky. That i s w h y  i t  has been commissioned by the m i n i s t e r .  The 
ca p i is  f o r  the church,  and the d i v i n i t i e s  stand in the background when 
the smith th inks o f  the p a r is h io n e rs ,  when he decides which fa c e t  o f  the
cap w i l l  face where, f o r  the people gather in the church to sing and
I .
pray in thanksgiv ing f o r  the sun and ra in  which feeds the s o i l .
Mortals move w i t h in  the space provided by the th in g .  Heidegger  
does not mean space to be r e la t io n s  o f  mathematical  construct ions.
Reminiscent o f  Being and Time, mathematical  space has no p la ce ,  no h o r i -
142 tzon, but is merely the measure o f  extens ion .  (Again,  as we have noted 
e a r l i e r ,  Heidegger has not abandoned h is  c r i t i c i s m s  of science as p r i ­
v a t i v e ;  but as we have seen, i t  is not the exhaustive analys is  o f  
measurement given by Cartesian mapping which is d e t r im e n t a l ;  i t  is r e ­
p la c in g  loca t io n  o r ie n te d  by things w i th  technologica l  objects  which 
make l i f e  easy th a t  is the d e t r im e n t . )  Rather ,
a space is something th a t  has been made room f o r ,  some­
th in g  th a t  is c leared  and f r e e ,  namely w i t h in  a boundary.
Greek peras • A boundary is not t h a t  a t  which something 
stops b u t ,  as the Greeks recognized,  the boundary is 
th a t  from which something begins i t s  p re s e n t in g , th a t  
is why the concept is th a t  o f  hor i  smos, th a t  is . , ' th e  
horizon the boundary. Space is in essence tha t  fo r  
which room has been made, th a t  which is l e t  in to  i t s  
bounds.1^3
The room w i t h i n  the horizon is  where man dwe l ls .  A horizon sets the
l i m i t s  whereby we f in d  meaning o f  those things gathered in th a t  space.
The farmhouse in the Black Forest mir rors  the horizon o f  l i v i n g  a l i f e  o f
farming in t h a t  p lace ,  the Black Forest .  The house is b u i l t  on the lee
slope f o r  p ro te c t io n  from the winds; the slope o f  the roof sheds the
w in te r  weight o f  snow. I t  is b u i l t  near a spr ing  to provide water  f o r
the everyday chores o f  washing and d r in k in g .  11 . . . I n  th is  way i t
designed f o r  the d i f f e r e n t  generat ions under one roof the character  o f
t h e i r  journey through t im e .  A c r a f t  which,  i t s e l f  sprung from d w e l l in g ,
144s t i l l  uses tools  and frames as things b u i l t  the farmhouse." Such a 
farmhouse can only be understood o f  i t s  locat ion  and who tha t  locat ion  
creates a space wherein a fa m i ly  dw e l ls ,  wherein they l i v e  out t h e i r  
l i v e s  in terms o f ,  and in conjunct ion w i t h ,  th a t  p lace .
So too ,  i t  is  w i th  the smith who moves w i t h in  the space centered
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on the country church and the room o f  h is  work wor ld .  The two conjoin  
when he undertakes the b u i ld in g  o f  a cap fo r  the s te e p le .  The church 
s i t e s  a place where a community gathers fo r  p ra y e r ,  but a lso f o r  the 
c e le b ra t io n s  and f e s t i v i t i e s  sca t te re d  throughout the summer. Those 
f e s t i v i t i e s  occur w i t h in  the horizon o f  farming on the p la ins  o f  the 
midwest; the Saturday dances and p icn ics  r e f l e c t  both a 1 i f e  o f  farming  
in tha t  area and a c e le b ra t io n  o f  tha t  l i f e .  The smith is not unaware 
o f  th is  space f o r  he knows the importance and s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  the church.  
He responds to t h i s  space and the things w i t h in  i t  not as j u s t  another
j o b ,  but as one which needs specia l  c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  such as craf tsman-
!?
sh ip .  Those c o n s id e ra t io n s ,  l i k e  why a c e r t a in  f a c e t . o f  the cap must 
face a c e r t a in  way,  do not leave him when he moves w i th in  the e n v i ro n ­
ment o f  h is  workshop, the space o f  h is  work w o r ld .  Those considerat ions  
make reference to the s k i l l s  he w i l l  need to execute the b u i ld in g  o f  the 
cap; the use o f  too ls  re fe rs  back to the s teep le  and i t s  s ig n i f ic a n c e .
By c ontra s t  a technologica l  device, e l im in a te s  hor izons ,  since  
w i t h in  . the framework resources are at  one's d is p o s a l - - t h e  sense o f  the 
world which is  revealed is only tha t  o f  resource.  Robert Socolow 
i l l u s t r a t e s  th is  p o in t  in the d e s c r ip t io n  o f  an o f f i c e  b u i ld in g :
The downtown o f f i c e  b u i ld in g  o f  the 1960s a lready  stands 
as a metaphor fo r  the whole s o c ie ty 's  des i re  f o r  inde­
pendence from the na tura l  s e t t i n g :  temperature ,  hum id i ty ,
a i r  exchange, and l i g h t i n g  are a l l  c o n t ro l le d  mechanica l ly ,  
independent o f  season, wind speed or whether one is on the  
nor th  or  south side o f  the b u i ld in g .  N e i th e r  m a te r ia ls  
nor design change as the locat ion  is moved in l a t i t u d e  by 
thousands o f  m i le s .  ( In  p h y s ic is t s '  j a rg o n ,  the b u i ld in g  
is in v a r ia n t  under n ine ty -degree  r o t a t i o n s ,  displacements  
in space,  and t r a n s la t io n s  in t i m e . ) 1^5'
The lack o f  ho r izo n ,  then,  is twofo ld :  the framework presents a l l  r e ­
sources as equal in the form o f  commodity, and as a commodity, the world
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as resource* cannot r e f l e c t  a g re a te r  r ichness.  An o f f i c e  b u i ld in g  is 
but one b u i ld in g  where one can work,  but i t  may be replaced e q u a l ly  by 
any o ther  b u i ld in g  regardless o f  design or m a te r ia ls  w i th  on ly  a l lo w ­
ances f o r  convenient lo c a t io n .  A l l  bu i ld ings  are e q u a l ly  access ib le  to  
us: i f  we need only  to d r iv e  from home to work the d i r e c t io n  we go is
o f  l i t t l e  consequence. I f  a b u i l d i n g ,  such as a home, were to o r ie n t  
us, then an o f f i c e  in v a r ia n t  in regards to displacements in space would 
not a id  us in th a t  o r i e n t a t i o n ,  since the s t ru c tu re  does not r e f l e c t  
any acknowledgement o f  the w o r l d . ^ ^
With a l l  commodities given as eq u a l ,  no horizon e x is t s  since one 
commodity can be exchanged fo r  another .  No h is t o r y  may accrue in terms 
o f  a th in g ;  by in terchanging one device f o r  another we no longer "s ta y"  
w i th  one th ing  a l lowing a space to grow around i t .  Our r e la t io n s  wi th  
cars serve as a good example.  Unt i l  re c e n t ly  Americans assumed th a t  we 
should trade  in the old car every  year  or  two f o r  a newer,  f l a s h i e r  
model. But w i th  those cars which l a s t  longer ,  people acquire  a sense o f  
h is t o r y  and r e lu c t a n t l y  and sadly  l e t  them g o . ^ 7  S t i l l ,  we s e l l  o f f  
the car when i t  shows signs o f  wear,  when i t  r a t t l e s  and pings j u s t  a 
l i t t l e  too much. So instead o f  a t tend ing  to i t s  adjustment,  we opt fo r  
the disburdenment the framework has to o f f e r  and get a new one.
B u i ld in g ,  then,  is making th in g s ,  and so is our entrance in to  the  
space which r e f l e c t s  the f o u r f o ld .
B u i ld in g  puts up locat ions  th a t  make space and a s i t e  
f o r  the f o u r f o ld .  From the simple oneness in which 
ea r th  and sky,  d i v i n i t i e s  and mortals belong to g e th e r ,  
b u i ld in g  rece ives the d i r e c t i v e  fo r  i t s  e re c t in g  o f  l o ­
c a t io n s .  B u i ld in g  takes over from the fo u r f o ld  the 
standard f o r  a l l  the t ra v ers in g  and measuring o f  the 
spaces th a t  in each case are provided f o r  by the l o ­
cat ions tha t  have been founded. The e d i f i c e s  guard
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the f o u r f o l d .  They are th ings  tha t  in t h e i r  own way 
preserve the f o u r f o l d .  To preserve the f o u r f o l d ,  to  
save the e a r t h ,  to rece ive  the sky,  to awai t  the d i -  
v i n i t  ies , to escor t  m o r ta ls - . - th is  fo u r f o ld  preserv ing  
is the simple n a tu re ,  the presenc ing,  o f  d w e l l in g .  In 
t h is  way, then,  do. genuine bu i ld ings  give form to 
dwel l ing  in i t s  presencing and house th is  presence.
Mortals p a r t i c i p a t e  in the preservat ion  o f  the w o r ld ,  o f  the f o u r f o l d ,  
by invo lv ing  themselves in the  b u i ld in g  o f  th ings .  We must remember that  
t h i s  b u i ld in g ,  as involvement,  is broader.and deeper than the constru­
c t ion  o f  a house or  an o f f i c e .  Bu i ld ing  makes room f o r  the fo u r f o ld  
by p u t t in g  up a l o c a t io n ,  and we p a r t i c i p a t e  in the f o u r f o ld  in terms 
o f  th a t  lo c a t io n .  To dwell  means to make room f o r  focal  things by i n ­
vo lv ing  ourselves w i th  them. We make th is  room by re ce iv ing  from the  
th ing  the guidance and d i r e c t i o n  we need to car ry  out our involvement.  
Responding to a th ing  requires  not j u s t  the cues given by things fo r  our  
guidance,  but a lso  a t t e n t io n  to the o r i g i n  o f  the cues and the responses 
they evoke.  We set the cornerstone o f  a church based on the s ize  and 
layout  o f  the church and the way the kind o f  stone which we are using 
f o r  the cornerstone lays .  Upon r e f l e c t i o n  we see th a t  th is  b u i ld in g  is 
not iso la ted  but l i e s  w i t h i n  and r e f l e c t s  our awa i t ing  the d i v i n i t i e s ,  
th a t  i t  c reates a s i t e ,  on e a r t h ,  under sky,  where mortals gather to 
c e le b ra te  t h e i r  l i f e .
Such r e f l e c t i o n  Heidegger c a l l s  t h in k in g .  Thinking embodies the  
concern f o r  and response to th ings  o f  the world as they d isc lose  them­
selves  in t h e i r  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  f o r  our r e la t io n s h ip  w i th  such things is 
myster ious ,  not in the sense o f  amorphous, but in th a t  the s ig n i f ic a n c e  
they herald  and embody is g r e a t e r  than ourselves and y e t  we are  yet  
allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e  in i t .
Releasement towards things and openness to the  
mystery belong to g e th e r .  They grant us the p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  dwe l l ing  in the world in a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  way.
They promise us a new ground and foundation upon which 
we can stand and endure in the world o f  technology w i t h ­
out being imper i led by i t .  ^ 9
I t  is in thought th a t  we remember our past r e la t io n s  w i th  th ings
and the s ig n i f ic a n c e  they reveal  to  us.
. . .  The e ss e n t ia l  na ture  o f  th in k in g  is determined
by what there is to  be thought about:  the presence
o f  what is  p resent ,  the Being o f  beings.  Thinking is
th ink ing  Only when i t  r e c a l ls  in thought the f ^ r  > th a t  
which th is  word ind ica tes  proper ly  and t r u l y ,  th a t  i s ,  
unspoken and t a c i t l y . ^50
When involved w i th  a th ing  we r e c a l l  th a t  th ing and i t s  ga ther ing  o f  the
fo u r f o ld  as i t  has come to us b e fo re .  I t  is through th is  th ing  tha t  we
r e c a l l  past s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  and against th is  seek the meaning o f  what is
present before  us. A climb to the summit on a warm breezy day r e c a l l s
the trauma o f  an ascent in a storm, my p ar tn e r  and I making strenuous
and concentrated e f f o r t  to make a l l  the r ig h t  moves. The s ig n i f ic a n c e  of
t h i s  c l im b,  the te s t  o f  our s k i l l s ,  the re l ia n c e  on each o th e r 's
s t re n g th s ,  t r u s t  in ourselves and each o t h e r ,  comes in to  r e l i e f  when
seen through the f l u i d  climb on the sunny day. The joy  o f  such an
ascent is re in fo rce d  by our experience o f  the previous a t tempt .  But even
deeper,  such th in k in g  is thanking,  fo r  in the r e c o l l e c t io n  o f  our past
experiences we r e a l i z e  our mortal  I t y - - w e  are ones who are a l i v e ,  who
c o l l e c t  experiences and are able  to witness the ebb and f low o f  the
w o r ld ,  g r a t e f u l  f o r  both our openness to s ig n i f ic a n c e  and i t s  gracing
pre sence.
!
So, releasement towards th in g s ,  involvement wi th  them, and th ink ing  
belong toge ther .
89 ^
The two, however, are a lso i n s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  dwe l l ing  
so long as each, busies i t s e l f  w i th  i t s  own a f f a i r s  in 
separation '  instead o f  l i s t e n i n g  to one another .  They 
are able to l i s t e n  i f  both— b u i ld in g  and t h in k in g —  
belong to d w e l l in g ,  i f  they remain w i th in  t h e i r  l i m i t s  
and r e a l i z e  th a t  the one as much as the o ther  comes 
from the workshop o f  long experience  and incessant  
p r a c t ic e  J 5 1
I t  is w i t h i n  the bounds o f  a p ra c t ic e  tha t  we learn  what things have to
o f f e r  and where the i n t r i c a c i e s  o f  a th ing  show i t s e l f .  Coming back to
the same th ing  in p r a c t ic e  is the space wherein we gather  experiences from 
memory and r e f l e c t  on how the world shows i t s e l f ,  g iv in g  thanks f o r  i t s  
presence.
I t  is in the p r a c t ic e  o f  h is  c r a f t  th a t  the t insm ith  learns  the  
meaning o f  h is  wor ld .  Reflected  in h is  p r a c t ic e  is not ju s t  the use of  
to o ls  and the p e c u l i a r i t i e s  o f  a s in g le  sheet o f  metal as he works wi/th 
i t ;  he l i v e s  out his  l i f e  in tha t  p ra c t ic e  and r e g u l a r i t y .  He knows that  
i t  is there  he f inds  companionship w i th  his  w i fe  and the neighbor whom
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he c a l l s  on f o r  he lp ;  and i t  is in terms o f  the accomplishments he has 
made th a t  he shares w i th  those around him the joy  o f  h is  work and s k i l l .
The smith dwells  in the world through his  involvement as s k i l l s  e x h ib i te d
in p r a c t i c e .  i t  is only w i th in  the room which s h e l te rs  his p ra c t ic e  that  
the smith can ask meaningful questions about l i f e .  His b u i ld in g  gives  
form to the locat ion  o f  the f o u r f o l d ,  and i t  is against  the fo u r f o ld  
t h a t  quest ions about l i f e ,  as he dwells  in the w o r ld ,  may a r i s e .
11 . Conclus ion
What, then,  can we learn  from Heidegger in regards to the e l u ­
siveness o f  technology? He shows us th a t  there are hazards w i t h i n  the  
framework o f  technology,  namely th a t  the neglect o f  things c a r r i e s  w i th  
i t  the n eg lec t  o f  the s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  the world and our capac i ty  to 
respond to th a t  s ig n i f i c a n c e ,  arid u l t i m a t e l y  the e c l ip s e  o f  our cap ac i ty .  
The framework disburdens us by making commodities a v a i l a b l e ,  but i t  also  
provides f o r  d i s t r a c t i o n  by making a v a i l a b l e  devices to f i l l  our l i v e s .  
Thus our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  technology comes when we choose, on i n d i v i d ­
ual occasions or in community a c t io n ,  to l i m i t  the en t ry  o f  the disburden-  
ment o f  technology in to  our l i v e s .  What hangs in the balance is our  
commitment to the s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  the world d is c lo s ed ! in  t h in g s ,  and i t  
i s  those th ings  which should guide us in our dec is ions .  Our unease wi th  
technology l i e s  in technology's welcomed disburdenment and simultaneous  
displacement o f  those things w h ic h .c a l I  on our c a p a c i t ie s  to respond as 
f u l l  human beings and e n r ic h -o u r  l i v e s .
The turn to th ings  resolves fo r  Heidegger and us th is  ambigui ty.  
Focal th ings  reveal  s ig n i f ic a n c e  and guide us in the space we have c a l le d  
p r a c t i c e .  P ra c t ic e  al lows us access to the s ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  the world  
through involvement.  The involvement points  to our r e la t io n  w i th  the  
world through an unbroken reference to s ig n i f ic a n c e  and c a r r ie s  w i th  i t  
the h i s t o r i c a l  depth o f  coming back to the involvement again and again in 
p r a c t i c e ,  w i tnessing the changes in d isc losure  and r e c a l l i n g  them in 
memory.
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The work world o f  the t ins m ith  i s ,  o f  course,  but one example o f  
a space wherein one may involve  o n ese l f  w i th  a th in g .  The farmhouse,  
the b r id g e ,  the country church are also narrow in t h is  sense,  and p e r ­
haps somewhat s t y l i z e d .  But there,  are some c ru c ia l  fea tures  which may 
be e x t rac te d  from these examples. F i r s t ,  the l i f e  l ive d  out in the 
space provided by a focal  th ing is l i v e d  out day- to -day in the r e p e t i t i v e  
p ra c t ic e  surrounding those th ings .  P ra c t ic e  returns us to th a t  space 
where we encounter the s ig n i f ic a n c e  disclosed by a th in g .  The c ru c ia l  
d i s t i n c t io n s  between the framework o f  technology and th is  space are a) 
s ig n i f i c a n c e  is not secured and must b e .aw a i te d ,  and b) we do not in 
p r a c t ic e  forsake th a t  space when s ig n i f i c a n c e  does not appear.  Second, 
there  is depth involvement both in our r e c o l l e c t io n  and memory o f  past  
d isclosures  and in our contact w i th  o thers  and t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  past .  
T h i r d ,  i t  is in everydayness th a t  there  is c o n t in u i t y  w i th  the w or ld .  
Movement w i t h in  the space is not d is jo in t e d  but f l u i d  in s o fa r  as in v o lv e ­
ment w i th  a th in g ,  the smith 's  awl o r  shears f o r  example,  r e f e r  to the  
unbroken context o f  work.  The c o n t in u i t y  o f  going from a round o f  "Pac-  
Man" to a n ig h t  club is tenuous at  be s t :  t ru e  we may do a l 1 th is  in one
n ig h t  but the only re fe rence to c o n t in u i t y  these events have is th a t  they 
are events which d i s t r a c t  us and keep us occupied.  Fourth,  the space 
centered around a th ing  extends along the dimensions o f  the fo u r f o ld  and 
r e f l e c t s  the depth o f  the world along those dimensions.
There are many th ings in t h i s  world and many p ra c t ices  in which 
we may preserve them. The b ike I have r idden f o r  so many miles creates  
a space through which I engage the wind and meet the h i l l .  The h is t o r y  
which the bike  c a r r ie s  r e i t e r a t e s  a l l  the m i le s ,  a l l  the aches,  a l l  the
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e x h i l e r a t i o n  every time i set  out again .  As Heidegger notes ,  there  is 
more: the deer we meet on our walks ,  the earthen mug we d r in k  from; the  
too ls  we use, the instruments we p lay ;  a l l  these are things f o r  each 
makes room fo r  the world and the m ir ro rp la y  o f  the f o u r f o ld .  Things are  
u s u a l 1y s imple ,  inconspicuous, close by.
But amongst a l l  the things o f  the world and the p ra c t ice s  in which 
we can involve  ours e lv e s ,  to which do we commit ourselves? The choice ,  
o f  course, is not a r b i t r a r i l y  determining what w i 11 count as a s i g n i f i ­
cant th in g .  We respond to v a r io u s ,  but k in dred ,  things around us whjch 
w i t h in  t h e i r  own r ig h t  come forward to c la im us. Our choice l i e s  in 
which th ings  we respond to and to what ex ten t  we respond to t h e i r  c a l l .  
Again the choice is both in d iv id u a l  and c o l l e c t i v e ,  and along these 
parameters. I b e l ie v e  the confluence o f  Being and Time w i th  Heidegger's  
mature thought has some strong suggestions.  On the personal level  we 
should respond w i th  the c ap a c i t ie s  we have. We should engage ourselves  
in those a c t i v i t e s  which both reveal  s ig n i f i c a n c e  and involve us as f u l l  
human beings.  To l i m i t  our human d ig n i t y  engenders a f a ls e  sense o f  who 
we a r e ,  and a repea ted , f a i 1ure to d isc lose  s ig n i f i c a n c e  breeds b i t t e r ­
ness.  Most s t r o n g ly ,  however, the confluence suggests a r ichness tha t  
should be re levant  in both in d iv idua l  and communal d e c is ions .  That i s ,
we should look to those p ra c t ic e s  and a c t i v i t i e s  which br ing  us in contact
w i th  the o t h e r ,  w i th  the world and w i th  the h is t o r y  which surrounds and 
resonates in one's place in the wor ld .  The farmhouse is the s i t e  where a 
fa m i ly  l i v e s  through i t s  h i s t o r y ;  the s t e e p le 's  cap draws to gether  the
sphere o f  the fo u r fo ld  guarded in the church,  and the space o f  a
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craf tsman's  work wor ld .  Both r e f l e c t  the dimensions o f  the world and 
ye t  both express those dimensions un ique ly .  I f  reading Heidegger's  
mature works through Being and Time te l  1s us a nyth ing ,  i t  is th a t  his  
v is io n  o f  l i f e  in a technologica l  world puts technologica l  devices in 
t h e i r  proper place and seeks a l i f e  o f  involvement w i th  the world through 
things which car ry  h i s t o r i c a l  and focal  depth,  which guide our l i v e s ,  
and br ing us toge ther  w i th  others  as m orta ls .
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